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Robert Coover is one of a group of young American novelists who,
using philosophical and theological frameworks, have used literature as
a vehicle by which to exp7ore metaphysical areas that have been largely
ignored in recent decades. An abiding interest in Coover's fiction, as
befits a former philosophy professor (Bard College), is the whole ques-
tion of order vs. chaos, or, perhaps more appropriately, an Apollonian
vs. a Dionysian world view. In approaching this subject Coover poses
important questions to his reader -- questions dealing with our ways of
experiencing and thinking, questions examining our secular and religious
institutions, questions spotlighting the omnipresence in our lives of
myth and ritual, questions addressing our attitudes toward history, and
questions concerned with the ways we use language. In this manner Coover
seeks to say something about man as he is rather than about man as he
likes to think he is.
Coover believes the world to be ultimately random while man is
inwardly driven toward orderliness. By means of myth, ritual, history
and language man is able to evoke order out of chaos, according to Coover,
and thereby sacralize his world and make one's life meaningful. Such
orderliness is strictly man-made, Coover insists, and thus he sees man
as a sort of "games player" who, by means of his creative and imaginative
powers, is able to make rules, set boundaries, and even give a pep talk
or two. Man as "games player" runs a risk, however, of becoming so
wrapped up in his "game" that he is no longer able to say what the "real"
world is all about. The height of human awareness, for Coover, is to
recognize oneself as a "games player," to know what kind of game one is
playing and why the game needs to be played.
In examining Coover's fiction aesthetically and addressing the
philosophical and theological issues he raises we will come to see that
Coover's vision of man as "games player" is an inadequate one.
INTRODUCTION
In an article titled "What's Wrong With the Christians?" Leo
J. Hertzel takes note of a lack in modern American literature of fic-
tion dealing with "the sweep of history, Big Questioos, GOD," 1 but then
points to Robert Coover as an example of one of a group of young Ameri-
can novelists who, using philosophical and theological frameworks, have
begun to explore these neglected areas through what has come to be
called metafiction (the use of fictional forms to impose further forms).
But to say that Coover explores these areas is not to say that he at-
tempts to restore them to a position of preeminence. The fact is,
Coover has few kind things to say about our conceptions of God, and his
comments about history make Henry Ford's proclamation that "History is
bunk" seem almost charitable. Coover's theological importance as a
writer is attributable to the kinds of questions he asks in his fic-
tion -- questions dealing with our ways of thinking and experiencing,
questions examining our secular and religious institutions, questions
spotlighting the omnipresence in our lives of myth and ritual, and
questions concerned with the ways we use language. In a nutshell,
Coover asks questions that are designed to say something at:AA man as
he is rather than about man as he likes to think he is. This is why
1




Coover is an important writer for theologians to look at and discuss,
not for his answers, which, as I will point out at a later time, I find
ultimately unsatisfactory, but for his questions -- questions that need
to be asked but often are not.
Coover has published three novels to date: Thc Origin of the 
Brunists, which won the Faulkner Prize as the best "first novel" of
1966, The Universal Baseball Association, Inc., J. Henry Waugh, Prop.,
and the recently published The Public Burning. In addition, he also has
written a collection of plays under the title A Theological Position, a
volume of short fictions entitled Pricksongs and Descants, and numerous
other short fictions for various publications.
An abiding interest in Coover's work, as befits a former phi-
losophy professor (Bard College), is the whole question of order vs.
chaos, or, perhaps more appropriately, an Apollonian vs. a Dionysian
world view. The whole thrust of his work appears to revolve around the
question, "Is there order in the universe beyond my experience, and if
not, what is it that gives me the impression of orderliness?" In
working his way toward a resolution of this problem Coover whittles
away at the ways we experience the world, the ways we identify our-
selves with secular and religious institutions, the ways we seek con-
ceptually to understand the world, the ways we use language and history,
and the ways we use memories, legends and songs to order and sacralize
our experience. These are all means by which we seek to unify and make
sense of our world and ourselves. They are also means, Coover maintains,
by which we remove ourselves from the world as it actually is in the
dynamic present, thereby promoting in us a misapprehension of reality.
3
Coover claims that his goal is to "conduct the reader . . . to the real,
away from mystification to clarification, away from magic to maturity,
away from mystery to revelation." 2
The setting of The Ori,gin of the Brunists is a small town in
West Virginia or Kentucky that experiences a mining disaster. In this
situation, unlikely people are thrown together and a new religious move-
ment is born, complete with its own sacraments and based on its own con-
cept of history. In this way Coover parodies and debunks individual
religious experience, as well as the institutions that derive from them.
In The Universal Baseball Association Inc., J. Henry Waugh, Prop.,
Coover takes on our more theoretical conceptions of God. By means of a
parody of Christianity, whereby it is compared to reflection on a base-
ball game played with dice, Coover signals what he feels is the futility
of the theological task. Secular institutions come under fire in The
Public Burning as the Rosenberg executions of the early 1950's become
the focus of a series of events in which individuals forsake their true
selves in order to be immersed in an archetypal performance. Through-
out his fiction Coover points to the way
to codify the past, thereby limiting our
tunities in the present and stunting our
history and language are used
awareness of the myriad oppor-
future. "History is never
literal," Coover has a character in The Public Burning say to himself.





Pricksongs and Descants (New York; The New
1969), p. 79.
The Public Burning (New York: The Viking Press,
4
The question may be raised as to just how lost man would be if
he did not submit to the Apollonian desire for order. Coover sometimes
allows the orderliness which maintains his fictive world to be stripped
away, opening the gates for a Dionysian flood of excessive passion to
drown his characters in reality. Invariably, his characters recover and
again begin to reorder their world. His message seems to be clear: man
needs orderliness, and all the accoutrements (i.e. myth, ritual, history,
language) that go into the making of that orderliness. Thus Coover ulti-
mately sees man as a sort of games player, as someone who, by means of
his creative and imaginative powers, is able to make rules, set boun-
daries, and even give a pep talk or two. Man is able, in this way, to
evoke order out of chaos. It is important to note, however, that this
order is all of man's making. The height of awareness for Coover is to
recognize oneself as a games player, to know what kind of game one is
playing and why the game needs to be played. The alternative, which
Coover's fiction also portrays, is to be a games player so wrapped up
in the game that one is no longer able to say what the "real" world is
all about.
Of course, to be a self-conscious games player is to recognize
what Albert Camus calls the "absurd" -- the disrelationship between an
existing individual who demands meaning, justice and unity in the world,
and a universe which responds to his demands with mute silence. Coover
should not be grouped with existentialists like Camus, however, for
where Camus wants to somehow transcend the "absurd" through action and
thereby affirm his self over his condition, Coover is more inclined to
5
just accept the condition. 4 In other words, while some existentialists
might be inclined to lose themselves in the game, Coover is content to
be a good games player accepting the game only for what it is. "It's
not a trial," says one of Coover's characters musing about what we do
in life. "It's not even a lesson. It's just what it is." 5
Coover once remarked during an interview that he tends "to think
of tragedy as a kind of adolescent response to the uhiverse -- the
higher truth is a comic response. 6 Compare this with a quote from
Miguel de Unamuno's Tra.gic Sense  of Life: "For those who feel, life is
a tragedy, and a comedy for those who think." 
7
Coover is first and
foremost a thinker. Trained in philosophy as he is, Coover fills his
fiction with a content that mirrors his "thoughts" about life's problems.
Indeed, Coover, himself, is never far from the narrated action in his
stories, and tone becomes the dominant element in practically all of his
work. Realizing his fiction has developed out from a conceptual frame-
work helps us to properly place Coover on the literary map along with
others who write for the literate reader with an intellectual bent (e.g.
John Barth, Donald Barthelme, Jorge Luis Borges, Kurt Vonnegut).
In his book Black Humor Fiction of the Sixties Max F. Schulz
4
Max F. Schulz, Black Humor Fiction of the Sixties (Athens,
Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1973), p. 6-7.
5
Robert Coover, The Universal Baseball Association, Inc., J.
Henry Waugh, Prop. (New York: The New American Library, Inc., 1968),
p. 242.
6Leo J. Hertzel, "An Interview with Robert Coover," Critique,
XI, (1969), 23.
7
Miguel de Unamuno, Tragic Sense of Life, trans. J.E. Crawford
Flitch (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1954), p. 315.
6
notes several characteristics of Black Humor writers, 
8
most of which
are easily applicable to Coover's work. Coover blurs the distinction
between author and narrator, allowing him to interrupt the flow of story
to give his own response; he maintains this "blurring" so that his
presence may be felt throughout the work; he often redefines time and
history in order to build a fictive world in the mind G, the reader,
then "betray" that reader's fictive experience; he uses literary parody
to make relders aware t!-,at other views of reality exist concurrently
with those of their own making; and he expands the sensibilities of
readers by telling well-known stories from different perspectives --
thus telling of the Biblical flood from a drowned man's point of view
and the story of the Virgin Mary from Joseph's point of view.
A question that will need to be addressed at some point, but
not just yet, is whether such writing fulfills the aesthetic requirements
of literature. If so, in what manner may we judge it aesthetically
against other forms of 1 4 terature? Another question which will need to
be addressed at a later time is whether Coover is correct in his philo-
sophical and theological conclusions. In an effort to answer these and
similar questions we will have to make use of both literary criticism
and philosophical reflection. And, as the title of this project might
suggest, we will need to attempt a theological dialogue with Coover's
work.
There are many problems to be faced when attempting to do work
in the interface between philosophy or theology and literature. The
8Schulz, op. cit., p. 21-23
•
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most obvious need is to allow art and philosophy/theology to speak to
each other without losing either their independence or their integrity.
The problem centers in the fact that the critic is not, and cannot be,
a neutral measure of literary worth. Instead, the literary critic
carries with him implicit or explicit philosophical and theological
views that relate to the ultimate concerns of his life. J. Hillis
Miller points to this nemesis and its potential for harm in doing criti-
cal work when he writes:
11.
No doubt a good critic can reconcile his religious convictions
with catholicity of taste and wide-ranging sympathy for many
authors, but still he must be on guard against the dangers of un-
wittingly making works of literature over in his own image, or of
unjustly condemning them, or of failing to take them seriously
enough to put in question the authenticity of their religious
themes. The tension between dispassionate objectivity and en-
gagement is in the nature cfgliterary study and must be lived by
each critic as best he can.
Miller goes on in the same article to discuss a way, admittedly
imperfect, of minimizing the difficulty. The critic should sit before
the entire corpus of an author's work, he suggests, enter into his fic-
tive world sympathetically and involve himself with the author in such
a way that the artist and his work is allowed to speak for themselves.
To this end, the next section will examine closely the corpus of Coover's
work -- concentrating on the three novels and using the plays and shorter
fiction as needed -- so that his fiction can speak on its own terms.
9, Hillis Miller, "Literature and Religion," Religion and 
Modern Literature: Essays in Theory and Criticism, ed. G.B. Tennyson,
and Edward E. Ericson, Jr. (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdman's
Publishing Co., 1975), p. 39.
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In Chapter Two we will take a more critical look at Coover's fiction
in an effort to go beyond what his work says to an understanding of
what his work means. The completeness of Coover's vision will be stud-
ied from aesthetic, philosophical and theological viewpoints. Chapter
Three will be an evaluation of Coover's philosophy of man.
CHAPTER I
In an effort to understand better what Coover has to say in his
fiction, we will look at seven themes he addresses at length in his
work: (1) individual religious experience and religious institutions;
(2) theology; (3) public institutions; (4) history; (5) language; (6) the
"Phantom"; and (7) man as games player. Obviously, there is an arti-
ficiality about such a scheme as Coover interweaves these themes in such
a way that they all melt into one another. For our purposes, however,
the import of his literature will be more accessible if we differentiate
and concentrate our efforts on these seven topics.
Individual Religious Experience and Religious institutions 
In seeking to understand Coover's approach to religion, one must
concentrate his attention on The Origin of the Brunists. The action of
the novel centers upon the lives of several members of a small community
after a coal-mine accident kills ninety-seven people. A survivor from
the disaster, Giovanni Bruno, is brought to the surface after three days
in what, for the other miners, had become a tomb. Though little more
than a human "vegetable" as a result of the mishap, Bruno becomes tne
central salvific figure in a new religious movement through a series of
apparently random and serendipidous incidents. That the townspeople of
West Condon are in need of a new revelation is clear from the chrono-
logical beginning of the narrative:
9
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Only eight days since the new year began, but the vague hope its
advent traditionally engenders has already gone stale. It is true,
there are births, deaths, injuries, rumors, jokes, matings, and
conflicts as usual, but a wearisome monotony seems to inform even
the best and worst of them. 10
am
Some of the characters who gravitate toward Bruno are: a devout
fundamentalist housewife named Clara Collins, whose husband Ely has died
in the mining accident; an occultist named Eleanor Norton; a lawyer
named Ralph Heimbaugh; Bruno's angel-like s -ister Marcella; and a
newspaperman named Justin "Tiger" Miller. They come to the bedside of
the recuperating Giovanni Bruno for different reasons, but once together
a series of events lead them to draw certain conclusions about the di-
vine nature of Bruno and the impending end of the world, thereby drawing
other members of the community into the "pattern" that emerges. Of
course, there are those in the community who have invested all the years
of their lives in trying to fulfill other 'patterns" of living and who
feel threatened by this emerging and secretive group (cf., the town's
mayor, the banker, and the Nazarene and Presbyterian ministers). In
this manner the stage is set for a conflict which ends in a mini-apoca-
lypse near the close of the narrative.
What does Giovanni Bruno do to attract followers of such passion
and conviction? The answer, quite simply, is very little. We are told
that he had inhaled a great amount of carbon monoxide during his wait
in the mine and was in a coma when removed on the third day. A doctor
at the hospital explains that carbon monoxide tends to distort one's
10Robert Coover, The OriOn of the Brunists (New York: Ballan-
tine Books, Inc., 1966), p. 29.
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perception of reality, especially in those like Bruno who have exhibited
irrational behavior in the past. Thus it comes as no real surprise and
of no real concern to most when, upon regaining consciousness at the
hospital, he begins to mutter something about a vision -- something
about being visited in the mine by the Virgin in the form of a white
dove, Disregarded by most, these statements are enough to attract
others to Giovanni's side. The extent of Bruno's involvement are such
enigmatic statements as: "The coming . . of . . . light!"; "Sunday
. . . week"; and, "The tomb . . . is its message." On the surface, the
words are nonsensical, but when said in front of those who are attracted
to his side the context impregnates them with meaning. What attracts
the followers of Giovanni Bruno is not Giovanni Bruno, it is clear, but
the energy, passion and receptivity of the individual followers them-
selves. Giovanni Bruno is merely a convenient happening for this new
flock of believers.
Clara Collins, true to her fundamentalist beliefs, is convinced
her husband's death in the mine could not have happened without good
reason -- especially coming as it did at a time when he was about to
quit the mines to pursue a full-time Christian ministry, "Ifn he died
like that, they must be a reason:" she cries to Miller, the newspaperman.
"The Good Lord would not take Ely away ifn they weren't no reason: Would
he, Mr. Miller? Would he?" 11 She is faced with more questions after
reading a note her husband was able to write before he died:
11Ibid., p. 98.
12
DEAR CLARA AND ALL:
I dissobayed and I know I mu:. 3ie, Listen ?ilways to the Holy
Spirit in your Harts Abe in Grace. We stand togeth,.:r before
Our Lord the eighth of 14
The part about his disobeying she could understand. Ely had
been visited earlier by a white dove and told to leave the mines im-
mediately, but he decided to work a few more days. But what could he
have meant by sayinc, that he, his family and friends would all be
standing together the eighth of . . . . The eighth of what? She knows
there must be an answer. There always is in this God-ruled world. But
it is only after hearing that the lone survivor after three
mine had had a vision of a white dove that she has hope for
to the riddle. She rushes to his side.
Eleanor Norton and Ralph Heimbaugh take different paths to
Bruno's side: Eleanor through mystical revelations from a higher order
of Being named Domiron, and Ralph through an ingenious system of re-
corded events calculated according to numerological cycles. The fact
that the mine accident caught them both completely unprepared does not
make them forego the "patterns" they have been using to explain the
happenings of the world -- it is merely a matter of Eleanor receiving
new revelations and Ralph recalculating the numbers to make the accident
fit the "pattern" of their mystical and abstract systems. Eleanor and
Ralph are the first apologists for the Brunists, and the fact that they





only to solidify the vision they have of Bruno and of the coming end of
the world.
Giovanni's sister Marcella, a young woman of child-like faith,
is totally devoted to her brother and is able to see only the good in
people around her. The innocence she exudes lends a sense of purity to
the followers of Bruno. Her saintliness even manages momentarily to
chip away at the impious cynicism of the skeptical "Tiger" Miller,
pu'olisher of West Condon's newspaper and "chronicler, historian, com-
posite Matthew-Mark-Luke-John for the Brunists." 13 For Miller, the
Brunists are nothing more than good copy for his newspaper, and Giovanni
3runo nothing mo:.e than a mine-crazed nut. But he is, nevertheless,
sincerely attracted to Marcella. Although he cannot accept "her child's
view of the plenum," 14 she does appeal to something within him that
desires order and innocence.
Once the Brunists come together and begin to cohere as a group
there quickly merges a sort of "Us vs. Them" attitude toward the rest
of the community. Convinced they are thriving in the light of revealed
truth, they consign all those who resist their vision to the realm of
darkness. In order to survive in this Manichean struggle against the
"Powers of Darkness" they establish their own legends, songs and sacra-
mental rituals. Beginning with a password to gain entrance at the Bruno
house, the Brunists soon develop to where:
The lawyer Ralph Heimbaugh introduced hand signals and special
13Hertzel, "What's Wrong With the Christians?", p. 14.
14Coover, The Origin of the Brunists, p. 160.
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tunics to go with the White Bird password and, with Mrs. Norton and
Mrs. Collins, redesigned the altar and developed a meeting format.
His new tunics, which the women made and whi.2" they all wore at
their gatherings now, were white (the White Bird, the Coming of
Light) with brown (Bruno) ropes at the waist, and, embroidered in
brown on the breast, a large circle (Evening Circle, a Circle of
Evenings) enclosing a miner's pick, stylized to resemble a cross.
The dimensions of this pick/cross were numerologically determined:
seven units each for the arms and head, twelve units for the post
or handle, totaling thirty-three, the life io years of Christ, not
to mention an entire history of secondary meanings derived from
important ancient writings. A banner was designed with the same
emblem as the robes with the additi9n of a white bird flying above
the embroidered cross and circle.
In addition to this symbolizing of the Brunist story, various
songs are used to unify the group's adherents. This music communicates
not only the legends of the religious cult's origins, but also the high
calling of those who choose to be disciples. Examples of the songs are:
Do not think that God's Chosen are the mighty!
Do not think that God's Elect are the high:
Just remember the stories in your Bible:
'Tis the humble whom God doth glorify:
Think of Moses, discovered in a river:
Think of Jesus, a carpenter's son!
Think of Bruno, a humble coalminer:
'Tis the poor by whom God's battles are won:
So, hark ye to the White Bird of Glory:
Yes, hark ye to the White Bird of Grace:
We shall gather at the Mount of Redemption
To meet our dear Lord there face to face . . . 16
0 the sons of light are marching since the coming of the dawn,
Led by Giovanni Bruno and the voice of Domiron!
We shall look upon God's Glory after all the world is gone!




So come and march with us to Glory:
Oh, come and march with us to Glory:
Yes, come and march with us to glory:
For the end of time has come. 1/
(This second song may be sung to the tune of "Glory, Glory
Halleluiah:") *
In this way, Coover sets up a paradigm for a religious movement,
complete with its own set of legends, songs, rituals and sense of histo-
ry. It is also a paradigm which bears striking formal resemblances to
Christianity's origins. In doing so, Coover makes it clear through his
tonal presence in the narrative that the Brunists, as well as other
religious groups, blind themselves to reality by those same legends,
songs, rituals and sense of history that give their world the semblance
of order and meaning. The purpose behind the story of the "Black Hand"
(neighborhood children playing gruesome, though random, pranks in the
community, which were interpreted by the Brunists as the "Powers of
Darkness" striking out at them) is to show how a particular 'pattern"
leads us to describe the unknown and unknowable in ways that will fit,
and often justify, the "pattern" itself, No matter that we often fool
ourselves by such "patterns"; no m,,:ter that we often misappr-Thend rc-
ality; no matter that we conjure up all sorts of phantoms and bogeymen
and things that go bump in the night; no matter that we become so in-
volved in the game of life -- the game of ordering and making sense of
our world -- that we no longer recognize the world for "the mad scatter
it [is1," 18 The important factor for the Brunists is that they
17Ibid., p, 463 18Ibid,, p. 160
16
passionately believe that they are in touch with what is commonly
called Truth,
Lest anyone think it is only the religious fanatic who runs the
risk of deceiving himself, Coover also shows us what the Brunists and
the rest of the world look like from the viewpoint of the established
community. Led by the town's mayor, bankerand the Presbyterian minister,
the Reverend Wesley Edwards, the community relies on the cohesive
strength of "common sense" to resist this new revelation of the Brunists.
In other words, where the Brunists rely primarily on a subjective under-
standing of the truth of their claim, the response of the community and
of institutionalized, encultured Christianity is to rely on a more
"objective" understanding of the truth, Thus Coover is able to show us
a disembodied Christianity which has forgotten its own apostolic roots
and, in the process, merged individual Christians into the all-
encompassing "pattern" of modern, scientific, Western civilization.
This metamorphosis is personified in Rev. Edwards:
Tweed overcoat, Sam Snead hat, leather gloves, smirking smugly
around the stem of his briar pipe. Gregarious cleric of the new
confession, seer of the secular Christ. All of which meant that
once again the priests, having something to lose by risking the
challenge, were rolling with the punch. In one breath, Edwards
would ridicule "Mother Goose parsons" and boast of man's "progress
toward independence from any transcendent boss," then, puff-puff
on the pipe, turn right around and defend myth as "an image-
language reaching o4 beyond the particulars of appearance toward
the transcendence." 19
For Coover, the Rev. Edwards is no better off than the Brunists.
191hid., p. 305.
Although he avoids the excess emotionalism and irrationalism of the
Brunists, he finds himself. without really recognizing the fact, trying
to see the world through the empty forms of institutionalized religion
informed by a positivistic culture. In an enlightening conversation,
Edwards tells Miller that the Brunists are making themselves look ridicu-
lous by insisting that the end of the world is imminent. Whereupon
Miller asks:
"Do you think Christ rose?"
"Well," fumbled Edwards, "yes, of course." He emptied his pipe
into the wastebasket, reached into his coat pocket, withdrew a to-
bacco pouch. "But anyway, that's not the point, it doesn't
matter --"
"Exactly! It doesn't matter! Somebody with a little imagi-
nation, a new interpretation, a bit of eloquence, and -- zap! --
they're off for another hundred or thousand years," Miller passed
his hand over the heap of manila folders on his desk. "Anyway, it
makes a good story."
Edwards gazed down at the folders. "But, Justin, doesn't it
occur to you? These are human lives -- one-time human lives --
you're toying with!"
"Sure, what else?"
"But to make a game out of --"
Miller laughed. "You know, Edwards, it's the one thing you and
I have got in common."
Edwards stood there, indignant, dead pipe in hand, glaring down
at the folders. "The only difference," he said finally, curling his
mouth into a patronizing smile, "is that I know what I'm doing." 20
At the end of the novel, after an afternoon of riotous chaos in
which the Brun:sts stood on a hillside and whipped themselves into a
frenzy waiting for the end of the world, the Brunists begin to spread
over the country and win converts. The theology of 'Brunism" begins to
vary, depending on whether one hears Clara Collins or Eleanor Norton --
  p. 306-307.
18
much like the variations between Pauline and Petrine theology in early
Christianity. It is apparent that "Brunism" is becoming more socially
acceptable and institutionalized at the end of the narrative; that it
will gain a wider acceptance; and that, in time, it will no doubt forego
its own roots. But it is not the truth of the Brunist claim -- or the
truth of any other religious group -- that is important, Coover tells
us. What is important are the legends, songs, rituals and understanding
of history that allow believers to order and make sense of their world --
even if only for a generation or two. It is sort of like what Ely
Collins used to say before he was killed in the mine: "Grace is not
something you die to get, it is something you yet to live." 21
Theology 
The Universal Baseball Association Inc., J. Henry Waugh, Prop.
is an ingenious mating of baseball and religious parody to provide a
provocative treatment of the human theological task. J. Henry Waugh is
a middle-aged accountant who is able to escape his humdrum worklife at
"Dunklemann, Zauber & Zifferblatt, Licensed Tax & General Accountants,
Specializing in Small Firms, Bookkeeping Services & Systems, Payrolls
& Payroll Taxes, Monthly, Quarterly & Annual Audits, Enter Without
Knocking, into an imagined world of baseball complete with eight team
rosters, scoresheets, business reports and year-by-year results since
the beginning of its history. Using three dice, slips of paper and some
charts, Henry is able to create a world which, enlivened by his restless
21Ibid., p. 409.
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imagination, enfleshes the players of his game so that they becoirie living,
breathing individuals. These players come to have their own needs and
desires, their own passions and emotions, their own self-affirming wills
and sense of history.
J. Henry Waugh is a God-figure who brings forth a creation out
of the void and proclaims it good. Even his name is suggestive of the
Hebrew holy word for God (JHWH). As the narrative opens, Henry is on the
brink of a first-ever achievement in his creation as a young rookie named
Damon Rutherford is on the verge of pitching a perfect game. As the toss
of the dice continues to eliminate batter after batter and Damon com-
pletes his perfect game, Henry comes to realize that he loves that young
rookie more than any of the other players. Moreover, it is through his
love of young Damon that Henry renews his interest in a creation that was,
for a time, growing more tiresome.
Henry's exhilaration at the perfect game thrown by Damon pilis
over into his non-imagined world as he leaves his apartment, the perfect
game still spread on his kitchen table, and heads for a local tavern.
Not able to keep his joy bottled up inside, Henry tells a girl at the
bar:
Listen, Nettie, think what a wonderful rare thing it is to do some-
thing, no matter how small a thing, with absolute unqualified utterly
unsurpassable perfection:
Think of it, Nettie, to do a thing so perfectly that, even if the
damn world lasted forever, nobody could ever do it,Oetter, because you
had done it as well as it could possibly be done. 46
22Coover, The Universal  Baseball Association Inc., J. Henry
Waugh, Prop,, p. 23.
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What gives Henry particular pleasure in Damon's feat is the fact
that Damon did it independently of any direct intervention on his part.
Indeed, that was what made the game so interesting from Henry's point of
view. Although the game receives its life's breath from Henry's creative
imagination, the rules of the game are such that he is prohibited from
running the game by personal whim. Thus:
Even though he'd set his own rules, his own limits, and though he
could change them whenever he wished, nevertheless he and his
players were committed to the turns of the mindles,and unpredicta-
ble -- one might even say, irresponsible -- dice, "
Damon's perfect game is not something Henry contrived. It is an offering
from a created creature that pleases the creator very much.
Coover gives us a not so omnipotent God who presides over a cre-
ation that cannot be aware that its existence is predicated upon both
the imagination of its creator and the random roll of the dice. With
this God, Coover proceeds to describe events in the Universal Baseball
Association that bear unmistakable resemblances to Biblical tales and
the history of Judeo-Christianity.
In a re-creation of the Cain and Abel story, the dice dictate
that Damon be killed by a pitched ball from another rookie named Jock
Casey. Unbelievably, the one player whose offering had so pleased Henry
lay dead at home plate -- a victim of one of his fellow creatures --
killed because of "the rivalry, the secret grudge being nursed" by
Casey. 
24 Damon's death plays havoc with the Universal Baseball
23Ibid., p, 40. 24Ibid., p. 75.
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Association as the dice continue to thwart Henry's desire to punish
Casey and allow Damon's team to win the championship. Even though Henry
puts Casey in the worst possible situations, the dice persistcntly give
Casey the advantage. As for Henry, "if he didn't know better, he'd
suspect the dice of malevolence, rather than mere mindlessness." 25 The
Universal Baseball Association has lost its equilibrium -- and its cre-
ator is fast losing his -- when Henry invites a friend, Lou, to his
apartment to play the game with him. Perhaps Lou's inexperience, Henry
thinks, will be just enough of an advantage that he can regain control
and put the Association back in balance. Instead, Lou ends up nearly
destroying the Universal Baseball Association when, in an allusion to the
Biblical flood, he accidentally knocks over a bottle of beer.
Later, as Henry sits in his apartment, his beer-flooded Universal
Baseball Association drying on his bed, he thinks that maybe it is time
to just give up this game and go on to something else. But he then begins
to remember some of the events of past seasons and the pleasure his cre-
ation has given him -- especially that night when Damon threw the perfect
game. Now, all of it was coming to ruin because of an evil force that
had entered his creation in the person of Jock Casey. Henry notices the
last roll of the dice reading 2-6-6, and he nonchalantly tips the two
over to a third six, which would give the last two batters back-to-back
homeruns and, more importantly, move the game onto the Extraordinary
Occurrences Chart -- the same chart by which Damon was killed. This
time, Henry sees only the last entry on the chart: "6-6-6: Pitcher
25Ibid., p. 152.
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struck fatally by linedrive through box; batter safe on first; runners
advance one. 26 And the pitcher of the moment is none other than Jock
Casey.
Henry has a decision to make. Is the game really worth saving?
Wouldn't it be better to destroy his creation and be free of it? One
thing seems certain: if he kills Jock Casey then he will not be able to
quit -- it will be a commitment to his creation he will never be able to
27walk lway from. All the while he ponders what to do, Henry
kept seeing Jock Casey, waiting there on the mound. Why waiting?
Who for? Patient. Yes, give him credit, he was. Enduring. And
you had to admit: Casey played the game, heart and soul. Played
it like nobody had ever play it before. He circled round the man,
viewing him from all angles. lean, serious, melancholy even. And
alone. Yes, above a'1: alone. Stands packed with people, but
faceless, just multicolored shirts. Field full of players, but no
faces there either. Just a scene, sandy diamond, green grass,
ballplayers under the sun, stadium of fans, umpires, and Casey in
the middle. Sometim.,!s Cas4 glanced up at him -- only a glance,
split-second, pain, a ;)leading. . . . still Casey waited, and his
glance: come on, get it over, only way.
It is a painful decision to have to make, but finally:
Henry got up. He stumbled to the kitchen in his shorts. He
picked up the dice, shook them. "I'm sorry, boy," he whispered, and
then, holding the dice in his left palm, he set them down carefully
with his right. One by one. Six. Six. Six. A sudden spasm con-
vulsed him with the impact of a smashing line drive and he sprayed
a red-and-golden rainbow arc of half-curded pizza over his Associ-
ation, but managed to get to the sink with most of it. And when he'd
done with his vomiting, wn he'd finished, he went to bed and there
slept a deep deep sleep.
26Ibid., p, 200. 27Ibid., p. 201.
28Ibid., p. 201-202. 29Ibid., p. 202.
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Henry, for the first time, directly intervenes in the history of
his creation. By making Jock Casey the Cnrist-like sacrificlal lamb,
upon which all the evil of his creation is deposited, henry seeks to
return his creation to a proper balance. To provide even more order to
his creation, Waugh has one of his imagined ballplayers (Barney Bancroft)
write an account of the first fifty-six seasons of the Universal Baseball
Association which, rather than being simple history, could be used for
"the exposure of some pattern or other" by future players. 
30 
When
Henry finally decides on a title for this Bible-like collection of Associ-
ation legends, songs and rituals, he exclaims to a delivery boy:
"Yes, that's it!"
"That's what, Mr. Waugh?"
"The UBA in the Balance -- how does that sound to you, Benny?"
"Is it a riddle, Mr. Waugh? I'm not very good at riddles."
"Ha,lo: Yes, that's what it is: A riddle! You hit it on the
head:"
Henry disappears in the final chapter of Coover's narrative as
we are left with Association ballplayers several generajons after the
deaths cf Damon Rutherford and Jock Casey as they prepare for DAMONSDAY
CLVII. The only access the players have to their creator -- if there is
such a thing -- is through Bancroft's history and the various other
apocryphal stories about the origins of the Universal Baseball Associ-
ation. There are, in addition, the various theologies of groups such as
the Damonites and the Caseyites which seek to explain the legends and
myths. As the players talk to each other about the ceremony they are
30Ibid., p. 211. 31Ibid., p. 212-213.
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about to perform they sound "like 17th century parsons and death-of-
God theologians, Is there really a Henry Waugh? Who knows?" 32 In this
chapter, Coover points up the limitations of the players in their re-
lation to Henry and our limitations in relation to a creator God (Is
there a creator God? Who knows?). But this doesn't stop Association
ballplayers from theologizing any more than it does us, and comments
about Henry and the Association's origins include: "I don't know if
there's really a record keeper up there or not . . . But even if there
weren't, I think we'd have to play the game as though there were" 
33
;
"legend, I mean the pattern of it, the long history, it seems somehow,
you know, a folk truth, a radical truth" 34; and, "I'm afraid, Gringo, I
I„J-t agree with our ditinquished folklorist and foremost witness to the
oAological revelations of the patterns of history . . . and have come
35
to t.:1? conclusion that God exists and he is a nut." That such en-
deavc7ns ar, ultimately futile Coover makes amply clear. Further, such
theolcNizing, by whatever means, often blinds one to the dynamic present
he lives in. The substance behind the myths and legends that make up
one's theology are not Sc important for Coover as the fact that it is by
means of such myths and legends that people are able to order, make
sense of and sacralize their lives. In giving oneself over to the theo-
logical task one often loses touch with the actual living of one's life
32Wifred Sheed, Review of The Universal Baseball Association,
Inc., J. Henry Waugh t_ Prop., by Robert Coover, New York Times Book 
Review, July 7, 1958, p. 5.
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in the dynamic present in order to gain knowledge about something one
really cannot gain "knowledge" about.
At the end of the narrative, Coover leaves the reader with two
characters from the Universal Baseball Association, a catcher named
Paul Trench, who has travelled down every theological path with the
result that he is often paralyzed when confronted by a concrete situation
that demands a response, and a pitcher playing the role of Damon
Rutherford in the DAMONSDAY ceremony. Suddenly, Paul Trench experiences
a sort of epiphany in which his priorities are radically transformed.
As he stands with Damon on the mound before the ritual begins:
He doesn't know any more whether he's a Damonite or a Caseyite or
something else again, a New Heretic or an unregenerate Golden Ager,
doesn't even know if he's Paul Trench or Royce Ingram or Pappy
Rooney or Long Lew Lydell, it's all irrelevant, it doesn't even
matter that he's going to die, all that counts is that he is here
and here's The Man and here's the boys and there's the crowd, the
sun, the noise.
"It's not a trial," says Damon, glove tucked in his armpit, hands
working the new ball. Behind him, he knows, Scat Batkin, the batter,
is moving toward the plate. "It's not even a lesson. It's just what
it is." Damon holds the baseball up between them. It is hard and
white and alive in the sun.
He laughs. It's beautiful, tha, ball. He punches Damon lightly
in the ribs with his mitt. "Hang loose," he says, and pulling down
his mask, trots back behind home plate. 36
At least one person experiences a sort of redemption in The
Universal Baseball Association t. Inc., J. Henry Waugh, Prop. Paul Trench
learns to hold on hard to that which he can experience in the dynamic
present. Coover gives a similar lesson in a short story from Pricksongs
and Descants in which, perhaps alluding to John Wisdom's classic story
35Ibid., p. 242.
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of the Gardener, he wriLes:
Once upon a time there was an island visited by ruin and inhabited
by strange woodland creatures. Some thought it had once had a
caretaker who had either died or found another job elsewhere. Others
said, no, there was never a caretaker, that was only a childish
legend. Others believed there was indeed a caretaker and he lived
there yet and was in fact responsible for the island's tragic con-
dition. All this is neither here nor there. What is certainly
beyond dispute is that no one who visited the island, whether
searching for its legendary Magic Poker or avenging the loss of a
loved one, ever came back. Only their names were lgt, inscribed
hastily on walls and ceilings and carved on trees. 
'
Public Institutions
The Public Burning, Coover's most recent book, is easily the most
controversial he has penned to date. Whereas in his two earlier works he
depended upon a completely fictional account to engross the reader, The
Public Burning makes use of the very real executions of Julius and Ethel
Rosenberg, who were convicted of passing atomic secrets to Soviet agents
in the early 1950's. Also in the book is a character named Richard
Nixon, who, though obviously fictionalized, is in very many ways an
historically accurate portrait oF the Richard Nixon who was to become
the 37th President of the United States. The use of these historical
models in the narrative has caused a great deal of consternation among
critics, including Norman Podhoretz, the influential and highly re-
spected editor of Commentary magazine, who labels this work "a cowardly
lie." 
38
Part of the problem, undoubtedly, is a lack of understanding
37Coover, Pricksongs and Descants, p. 41.
38Norman Podhoretz, Review of The Public Burning, by Robert
Coover, Saturday Review, Sept. 17, 1977, p. 34.
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by critics of The Public Burnt ag of what Coover is about, as reflected
in his other works. In The Public Burnin9 Coover uses history to make
readers question the "pattern" that emerges from the reading of history,
much as he does with religious institutions in The Ori9in of the Brunists
and with theology in The Universal Baseball Association, Inc.„ J. Henry 
Waugh, Prop. In other words, Coover
and addresses the same themes as his
is entirely consistent with the rest
hits at basically the same issues
earl'er works. The Public Burning
of his fiction.
rhe action of the narrative centers around the execution of the
Rosenbergs -- admitted Communists who were convicted of passing secrets
to the Soviets, allowing Russia to built their own atomic bomb and thereby
eliminate the obvious advantage the United States maintained as the only
possessor of atomic weapons. But Coover, instead of holding the exe-
cutions within the walled confines of Sing Sing prison as
expect, places the event in the middle of Times Square SO




society. The actual struggle in the novel, of which the Rosenberg exe-
cutions are merely a manifestation, is a Manichean battle between an
utterly fantastic literary creation named Uncle Sam and an
character known as the "Phantom" (also known as Communism,
Reds, Traitors, Spies, Atheists, etc.).




Superhero and knuckle-rapping Yankee Peddler," 39 is an amalgam of every
American legend and cliche one would care to name, and the source by
39
Coover, The Public Burning, p. 8.
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which one can learn
about such things as statecraft and incarnation theory, rules for
the Community ol God, the meaning of the sacred in modern society
and the source of the Pha.itom's magical strength, the uses of rheto-
ric and ritual, and the hierology of free enterprise, football,
revival meetiggs, five-card stud, motion pictures, war, and the
sales pitch. 4u
Uncle Sam is all that makes our culture recognizably American,
the great American Myth that orders and justifies the existence of our
society. Our Presidents, voted into office by Americans from across the
land and therefore voted into office because they are viewed by Americans
as the embodiment of all that is considered good in America, are thus
treated by Coover as the incarnations of Uncle Sam. Of course, our
Presidents have differed widely as individuals, but at all times they
have exhibited the fundamental verities of honesty, industriousness,
conviction, piety, fairness, patriotism, and other deep-rooted values
that hold our society together. Richard Nixon, who is narrator for
approximately half of The Public Burning, is characterized as one who
all his life has accepted, unquestioningly, the American Myth and has
worked hard as a Congressman and Vice President to be perceived by the
American people in such a way that he, too, might become the incarnation
of Uncle Sam, the representative of the American way of life and a symbol
of the national psyche.
Uncle Sam, by his own admission, is not immortal, which may
account for his vigorous resistance to the "Phantom." At one point he
4 °Ibid., p. 83.
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says, "Nothin' goes on forever, . . . not even history itself, so why
:Fiould I? Sooner or later, the Phantom gets us all!
" 41 This should be
enough to tell the sensitive critic that Coover wants to speak of
something deeper and more profound thar the Rosenbergs and Richard
Nixon, that Uncle Sam is more than just literary hucksterism on his part,
and that the "Phantom" goes deeper than mere ideoloies. Uncle Sam
represents all the memories, legends, songs, rituals and understanding
of history, as maintained in our private experiences and reinforced in
our public institutions, that allow us, as Americans, to order our
society and make sense of our world. The "Phantom" is anything and
everything that threatens to destroy the viability of those same insti-
tutions. And the simple point Coover seeks to emphasize in The Public 
Burning (though, admittedly, he wastes too much time and uses too much
space to do so) is that in the populace's desire for order and in our
institutions' fight against the "Phantom" (i.e. entropy) the people may
block themselves off from an honest confrontation with reality and from
an awareness of one another's feelings. They do this by foregoing their
true selves and immersing themselves instead within culturally-defined
roles in the society.
That such people run the risk of becoming so involved in their
"role" that they are no longer able to experience reality on its own
teri,is is shown by the confrontation Richard Nixon has with a mob as he
approaches the White House for a cabinet meeting:
What troubled me most was the complete unreasoning hate in their
41ibid., p. 94.
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faces: this mob, I recognized, is a killer mob: I suspected some
of them were even doped up, and I feared that, if they saw who I
was, they'd get out of hand. They carried placards, shouted, and
seemed to be picking up things they might throw. It made me almost
physically ill to see the fanatical frenzy in the eyes of those
teen-agers; anyway, something was making me quite ill. I felt abso-
lute hatred for the tough Communist agitators who were driving
children to this irrational state, and I wanted to shout at them,
or scream, or bite them or something, but somehow I kept a grip on
myself, knowing that above all I had to control my emotions and think
calmly. . . .
In a larger sense, I recognized, this was another round in a con-
test which has been waged from the beginning of time between those
who believe in the right of free expression and those who advocate
and practice mob rule to deny that right. I might have calmed my-
self with such a thought, but there was no time -- one of the
ringleaders, a typical case-hardened Communist operative, stepped
into my path, blocking me off, a look of cold hatred in his eyes.
And I realized then, that right here was the ruthlessness and the
determination, the fanaticism of the enemy that we faced! That was
what I saw in his face. This was Communism as it really is. He
opened his mouth -- I felt like I was back in the lion's cage with
Sheba. Oh my God--:
"Excuse me, Mr. Nixon," he said, the rest closing up behippl,
forcing me to pull up short. "Could I have your autograph?"
The great discovery of Richard Nixon in the novel is that all of
the participants -- the Rosenbergs, Judge Kaufmann, President Eisenhower,
the Supreme Court, all those who witnessed the executions in Times
Square, as well as Nixon himself -- have put on masks and taken up so-
cietal roles in an archetypal drama. It was as though we'd all been
given parts to play decades ago," Nixon says, "and were still acting them
out on ever-widening stages.
. 43
Coover has a way of putting important observations in the mouths





"Can't we get past all these worn out rituals, these stupid fuckin'
reflexes? . They got nothin' to do with life, you know that,
life's always new and changing, so why fuck it Jp with all this shit
about scapegoats, sacrifices, initiations, saturnalias--?"
"I know who you are," I rasped. I could hardly hear myself.
"The game's up!"
I braced myself. I expected him to flash back in fury, I ex-
pected demonic sparks to ily from his eyes, fire from his parted
lips, something violent and amazing. I was ready to die. But he
only sighed. "Yeah," he said, "I'm only a lousy cabdriver. Shit, I
don't know everything. But I think you're on the wrong track.
Easter Trials, Burning Tree, morality plays, cowtohn vendettas --
life's too big, you can't wrap it up like that." 44
Still, people continue to perform societal roles as if preor-
dained to archetypal drama, Coover suggests. And if the past tells us
anything it is that people will continue to function as culturally-
defined masks in the future, thereby blocking their vision of reality
and the myriad opportunities that life presents to man in the dynamic
present.
History
In his short story "The Cat in the Hat for President" Coover has
a character named Clark expound on why the Cat in the Hat is suddenly
able to capture the imagination of the American people during the 1968
political campaign as he vies for the highest office in the land:
"Most immediately, Mr. Brown, the Cat is funny. And dramatic.
We have a terrible need for the extraordinary, We are weary of war,
weary of the misery under our supposed prosperity, weary of dullness
and routine, weary of all the old ideas, weary of all the masks we
wear, the roles we play, the foolish games we sustain. The Cat cuts
through all this. We laugh. For a moment, we are free."
"Maybe," I said, "but clowns never win elections."
44 Ibld., p. 273.
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"I see you are still resisting," said Clark. "In your adoration
of the past, Mr. Brown, you have isolated yourself from the actual
and the possible. It is the great Western disease."
"What? Freedom from illusions?" I asked drily.
"No, history." Clark was utterly imperturbable. Or else he had
a worse sense of humor even than I did. "The mystification of
history produced by our irrational terror of reality. If you'll
pardon the pun, Mr. Brown, we peed to perform a kind of racial his-
torectomy on all humankind," 43
Man is able to utilize many tools in ordering his world, Coover
tells us, with history being perhaps the most effective in our more
secular and pluralistic culture. Of course, what he means here by his-
tory is not a value-free description of events, but the interpretive
principle used in attending to and evaluating those events that make up
what we call "history," Even the wisest of historians will admit that a
completely objective view of history is impossible, that the best that
can be claimed is that some historians are more objective than others.
It is primarily to these "others" that Coover points, accusing them of
shrinking behind history in order not to face reality. The danger of
this abdication of the individual self to the altar of inexorable his-
tory is that it limits one's view of the myriad possibilities open to
him in the present and causes one to "see" only that which has precedents
in the recorded past. When Henry Waugh invites Lou to play his game with
him he gets upset when Lou scratches out one player and writes in an-
other. Henry tells his friend that he is not trying to be meddlesome
in telling him who he may and who he may not play. "It's just that
45Robert Coover, "The Cat in the Hat for President," New Ameri-
can Review, IV (August, 1968), 20-21,
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there's a whole history here." 46 Henry cannot "see" the possibility of
thic7 new batter because of his sense of history, and is left indicted a
few moments later when the dice dictate that this new batter get a double
off the rightfield wall.
One's sense of history can lead to a misapprehension of reality.
Even scholarly journals are not free of such "misapprehensions." A most
blatant example of this is the Marxist who accuses the United States of
genocide against its Black population in a 1974 edition of Revolutionary 
World. The author uses as his historical evidence:
In 1967 the life expectancy for the white male under the age of one
was 6.7 years greater than that for the non-white male, It ie multi-
ply 6.7 times 22,000,000, the number of Negroes now living in the
United States, we get 147,400,000 years as the total .umber of years
of deprived life. If we divide this by 70 years, which is greater
than the average length of life for a white person, the result is
the equivalent of more than 4000,000 black lives that t-.ave been
lost over a 70 year peiiod. 41
That the argument is specious is, it is hoped, clearly recog-
nized by all. The important point for us to note is that it ir the
writer's "Marxist" understanding of history and perception of events that
compels him, in spite of what can be assumed is a sincere earnestness
on his part, to an absolutely cockeyed view of historical events. Lest
anyone feel smug by comparison with this "straw man" example, Coover
wants us to recognize that we are al susceptible to being blinded to our
possibilities in the present by our ordered undes'standing of the past.
46Coover, The Universal Baseball Association, Inc., J. Henry
Waugh, Prop., p. 184.
47Howard L. Parsons, "Black Poverty and Dehumanization in the
United States," Revolutionary World, IX (1974), 79.
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For our own part, we are often willing accomplices to our own self-
deception as we forego the improbabilities of the present for the more
cohesive vision of self and society that "history" can give.
In The Public Burning Coover gives us two views of history: one
saying history is patterned and is leading inexorably towarc an ultimate
telos, and a second saying history is the accretion of one accident upon
another which is given a sense of order by man's abilities of imagination.
The former view is demonstrated in the novel by the belief of many of the
characters that the United States has a Providential calling to direct
history toward "the New Athens, New Rome and New Jerusalem. 
48 This
view is personified in Nixon's belief that history is at all times
49
"working things out for me in its inexorable but friendly way. In-
deed, the public reason given for the harsh punishment meted out to the
Rosenbergs is that because of their betrayal they have undoubtedly
"altered the course of history to the disadvantage" of the United
States. 
50
But it is Nixon who gives us glimpses of the latter view as
well, as he transcends, for a while, the "pattern" of history:
And then I'd realized what it was that had been bothering me: that
sense that everything happening was somehow inevitable, as though
it had all been scripted out in advance. But bullshit! There
were no scripts, no necessary patterns, no final scenes, there was
just action, and then more action. 51
Later, he tells Ethel Rosenberg, who he has come to view as a victim of
her own sense of history:
48Coover, The Public Burning, p. 9.
49Ibid., p. 175. 50Ibid., p. 25. 51Ibid., p. 362.
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We've both been victims of the same lie, Ethel: There is no purpose,
there are no causes, all that's just stuff we make up to hold the
goddamn world together -- al we've really got is what we have right
here and now: being alive: "
Richard Nixon experiences a few heady moments of freedom in which,
according to Coover, he is able to look beyont the societal blinders
placed on him by history and experience reality on its own terms. But he
also finds that in doing so he is leaving the community of men -- a com-
munity which, by means of its legends, songs, myths ad rituals all
bounded up in its understanding of history, gives sense and meaning to
his world. In the end, Nixon succumbs again to societal pressures for
conformity and cohesion as Uncle Sam symbolically sodomizes him and fills
him with his seed.
In our natural desire for order, history is indeed a seductive
siren telling us what to pay attention to and how it should be perceived.
A common rendering of history can hold a society together, help it to
raise its children "seeing to it that they get properly oriented to the
life ahead of them, . . . that they learn what's good and bad, right and
53wrong."
But there are times, however, when events force some toward what
existentialists call "boundary situations." One is able to see penetra-
tingly into the world at such times and view those forms that order his
world from a different perspective. Perhaps he will come to recognize,
52Ibid., p. 436.
53Coover, The Origin of the Brunists, p, 337.
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as one of the characters from The Origin of the Brunists does:
History is like a big goddamn sea, Sal, and here we are, bobbing
around on it, a buncha poor bastards who can't swim, seasick, lost,
unable to see past the next goddamn wave, not knoling where the hell
it's taking us if it takes us anywhere at all." 34
It is in making such observations, Coover suggests, that history
can at least be seen in its proper perspective as oe of several tools
utilized by man to make sense of his world. But that "sense," he makes
clear, has no existence apart from the Lreative imagination of man.
Language
In the preceding, Coover demonstrates several methods by which
man goes about ordering his world without directly addressing the one
ingredient endemic to this activity -- language. Language is terribly
complex, mysterious in its subtlety and awesome in the power it has over
us. The vehicle by which history is able to exert its cohesive influ-
ence on society, Coover makes plain, is the spoken and written word;
hence, the emphasis in his fiction is upon the oral tradition of myths
and rituals, the use of song, and the objectification of experience in
newspapers and magazines. It is for good reason that Coover makes one of
the lead characters in The Origin of the Brunists a newspaperman, that
Henry Waugh feels compelled to have a written history in order to bring
his Association to life, that one of the ballplayers in his Association
must write a history of the Damon Rutherford-Jock Casey confrontation,
and that whole sections in The Public Burning are given over to
54Ibid., p. 381.
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discussions about the impact of The New York Times and Time Magazine --
which Coover seriocomically refers to as the National Poet Laureate --
on American society.
In a short fiction, "The fallguy's faith," Coover shares with his
reader the thoughts of a man as he plummets through space in a suicide
jump from some high place. As he falls, he is struck by a question:
Why was it, he wanted to know, why was it that everything that had
happened to him had seemed to have happened in language? Even this:
Almost a though, without words for it, it might not have happened
at all: 5
In many ways, we are the creation of our language, Coover tells
us. The way we perceive ourselves, others and the world is often de-
pendent upon how we use language.
In The Origin of the Brunists and The Universal Baseball Associ-
ation, Inc.j J. Henry Waugh, Prop., Coover shows how the Brunists and the
Universal Baseball Association are first able to gain a sense of identity
through che use of oral transmissions of legends via story and song. The
balladeers of Coover's novels become, in effect, the first artist-priests
of his fictive worlds, who are able to aid others in transcending their
limitations and participating more meaningfully in their world through
musical language. But Coover also sounds a warning: in integrating
oneself into an ordered world as described in words -- no matter how
pleasing or convincing the aesthetic package -- the neophyte may be
cutting himself off from the world as it really is. The disservice that
55Robert Coover, "The fallguy's faith," TriQuarterly, XXXV
(Winter, 1976), 80,
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Sandy Shaw -- foremost folklorist of the Universal Baseball Association --
performs for his listeners is that through his songs he "provided them
with dreams and legends that blocked off their perception of the
truth." 56
With the rise of "culture," oral traditions give way to written
57
documents, which in turn result in a burgeoning sense of history.
Thus man runs the risk of becoming even further removed from an open
confrontation with reality as experience is objectified in the printed
word -- a Kierkegaardian concept that will be considered more closely at
a later time. Coover points to the dancer of this objectification of
experience in The Public Burning when he writes:
"Objectivity" is in spite of itself a willful program for the stacking
of perceptions; facts emerge not from life but from revelation.
gnarled as always by ancient disharmonies and charged with libidi-
nous energy. Conscious or not, The New York Times statuary functions
as a charter of moral and social order, a political force-field maker,
defining meaningful actions merely by showing them, conferring a
special power on those 4.touches, creating the stations of life that
others might aspire to.
A few pages later, Coover remarks on those whose experience of
life is only at the vicarious level allowed by language, saying they
may need to read here tomorrow what momentous events were transpiring
just behind the slab one stood before today. People press themselves
against the Father's Day advertisements and crisis tabulations, fail
56Coover, The Universal Baseball Association, Inc., J. Henry
Waugh, Prop,. p. 103.
57Mircea Eliade, Myth and Reality (New York: Harper & Row,
Publishers, 1975), p, 157-161.
58Coover, The Public Burning, p. 191.
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to notice the people leaping out of buildings, girls being raped on
subway platforms, the colliding traffic. They vibrate before the
reported joy of the Rosenbergs at news of their stay and the edi-
torial on moustaches (Julie's has been shaved off), but cannot see
the crowds gathering outside the Supreme Court building, the writing
on the bway walls: OBJECTIFICATION IS THE PRACTICE OF ALIEN-
ATION:
Through words, then, we have a tool, awesome in its power, by
which we may control our experience and thereby order our world. Richard
Nixon, when confronted by opposing political and psychological forces,
feels the most promising path toward reconciliation of botn his society
and his psyche is to "write a speech." "That was what language was for,"
he declares, "to transcend the confusions, restore the spirit, re-create
the society 60!" But the intriguing thought Coover leaves his reader
with -- especially intriguing considering the fact that the medium for
Coover's message is, itself, language -- is that such a pragmatic use of
language may, in the long run, be debilitating to man in that it leads
him to accept a misapprehension of reality and blinds him to myriad other
possibilities.
"Should never have invented the written word," newspaperman




In the preceding sections we have seen how religious and secular
59Ibid., p. 194. 6 °Ibid., p, 234,
61
Coover, The Origin of the Brunists, p. 158.
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institutions, theology, history and language are used by the characters
of Coover's fiction to order their fictive world. We have also seen how
Coover's cha.-acters have been deceived by these same tools. The ordering
of their world has forced them to misapprehend the world as it really is
encountered in their experience. It is clear that Coover is also ad-
dressing his reader, telling him that he, too, has been, is now, and
undoubtedly will continue to be, fooled by his inherent drive for pattern
and order. The reason one allows himself to be deceived and to accept an
inadequate picture of the world is that he fears more than anything else
the alternative. And the alternative in Coover's scheme of things is
what in The Public Burning he calls the "Phantom." At a superficial
level this "Phantom" is anything (e.g. Communism, atheism) that threatens
to disturb one's ordered world by means of a "different" interpretive
principle. At a deeper, existential level it is the suppressed recog-
nition that chaos and entropy -- which make a mockery of all ordered
systems -- are the true foundations of the world.
For Coover, we live in an essenticlly random universe. Whatever
order may be derived from the world, he maintains, says more about the
creative and imaginative faculties of man than it does about the world
itself. Point a man towards the heavens and the serendipitous arra
y of
stars and he will point out a Big Dipper, a bear, a ram and a couple of
fish. Give a man some accidental inkblots and he will conjure up all
sorts of things. Man is compulsively driven toward order, Once he comes
to believe not just in the efficacy of his ordered world but in its
"truthfulness," he will go to great lengths -- even death -- to rea
ffirm
that vision. But Coover also wants his reader to know that the "Ph
antom"
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is always nearby. No, he's more than nearby; he is within us.
Coover gives us many renderings of the "Phantom" in his fiction,
with one of the more forceful coming from the "Phantom's" arch-enemy,
Uncle Sam:
"Pure sorcery and dangerous as a Massasip allagator with a tapeworm!
They call him Sudden Death and General Desolation, half cousin to
the cholera and godfather of the Apocalypse! He's all what most
maddens and torments, all what stirs up the lees a things, all what
cracks the sinews and cakes the brain, all the subtle vinimus
demonism of life and thought, that mysterious fearsome force which
from time immemorious has menaced the peace and security of mankind
and buggered the hopes of the holy.
And he infects everything, our litterchur, art, religion, games,
deemocratic system and free enterprise, with the pizen -- you re-
member all this, son, you can use it yogself some day -- with the
pizen of his evil sinister influence:"
The "Phantom" is a threat to our ordered world precisely because
it declares any orderly system as meaningless. Faced with such an all-
pervasive threat, it is easy to understand why like-minded people who
share a common view of the world will band together to resist all those
who might threaten their vision; hence, the strong "Us vs. Them" attitude
of the Brunists as they resist the Powers of Darkness, and of the Ameri-
can people (characterized as the Sons of Light) as they resist the
"Phantom" in the guise of Communism.
The truly shattering realization comes when one learns that the
"Phantom" is not some particular force "out there" that seeks to subvert
one's world view, but rather a state of affairs that pervades both one's
external and internal worlds. At various times throughout The Public 
62Coover, The Public Burning, p. 335-336.
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Burning Nixon speaks of "that swarm of black thing" within him, and is
able to get it out in the open briefly when he thinks to himself:
It all served to confirm an old belief of mine: that all men contain
all views, right and left, theistic and atheistic, legalistic and
anarchical, monadic and pluralistic; and only an artificial -- call
it political -- commitment to consistency makes then hold steadfast
to singular positions. Yet why be consistent if the universe wasn't?
In a lawless universe, there was a certain power in consistency, of
course -- but there was also power in disruption: I'd let go of the
armrests and, farting liberally, had begun to feel a lot better --
though troubled at the same time with an uneasy feeling of having
learned something truly dangerous, like the secret of the atom
bomb -- which was not P physical diagram or a chemical formula, but
something like a hole in the spirit. The motive vacuum. And I'd
understood at last the real meaning of the struggle Against the
Phantom: it was a war against the lie of purpose: "
Not one of us is entirely safe, Coover suggests, for the
'Phantom" creeps up on us all during our private reveries. And sooncr
or later, as Uncle Sam says, "the Phantom gets us all." 64 At the end
of The Oriq.in of the Brunists the followers of Bruno stand on a hillside,
whipping themselves into a frenzy of religious ecstasy as they await the
"Coming of Light" and the end of the world. Irregardless of how poorly
reasoned their belief in Bruno may have been, they were, nevertheless,
reasoned as they sought to understand the "pattern" of events in West
Condon after the mine accident. But the "Phantom" gets hold of them on
that hillside as they descend into an instinctual chaos governed only by
the excessive passion of the moment. Similar treatments of man in the
grip of chaos are included in The Uriversal Baseball Associationj Inc., 
J. Henry Wau_gh Prop., and Coover's short story "The Cat in the Hat for
631bid., p. 363. 64Ibid. p. 94.
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President," But his most instructive treatment of this theme comes near
the end of The Public Burning. The crowd of onlookers gathered in Times
Square to witness the execution of the Rosenbergs fall into a Dionysian
revel of orgiastic excess, the laughter of the "Phantom" resounding in
the background all the while. When brought back to their senses by the
power of Uncle Sam -- by the power of the shared attitudes and values
that hold their society together -- the reader is told that no time had
passed during the chaotic melee. No time at all. It was but a glimpse of
the phantom-like subconscious within man that is not amenable to an
ordered existence -- Freud would call it the Id; Robert Bly the Reptile
Brain. This phantom-like subconscious is a part of all of us. For
Coover, it may even be the most honest and most realistic part of us, a
giddy part that "made hard things soft, silly things true, grim things
comic. . . the primitive condition, the non-reflective operating thing:
res." 
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Man as Games Player
In spite of his belief that we live in an ultimately random uni-
verse, Coover still wants to say that what one does in ordering his world
is important. It is not the "truthfulness" of a particular world view
that fascinates and impresses Coover, but that one is able through his
creative and imaginative powers to establish order out of chaos. This
is what is significant, ne tells us. This is what we must attend to as
we seek to understand ourselves and our world.
65Coover, The Universal Baseball Association, Inc., J. Henry
Waugh, Prop., p. 95.
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;hose who are able, momentarily, to break out of the "pattern"
of their lives, as Nixon is able to do in The Public Burning, invariably
return to the comfort of the "pattern" -- even if they no longer believe
in its truthfulness. Man needs orderliness, Coover is saying, and all
the accoutrements (i.e. myth, ritual, history and lenguage) that go into
the making of that orderliness. Thus, Coover ultimately sees man as a
sort of games player. Through his creative and imaginative powers one
is able to make rules about how he will perceive the world and interpret
his experience, thereby evoking order out of chaos. Such an order is
strictly man-made, but for Coover this is enough to carve out what he
considers a significant niche for man.
The real question that is posed for the reader is whether or not
one recognizes himself as a games player. For Coover, the height of
awareness for an individual is to recognize oneself as a games player, to
know what kind of game one is pLying and why the game needs to be
played. The alternative is to be a games player so wrapped up in the
game that one is no longer able to experience the world as it really is.
Coover gives us fictional examples of both the self-consciously aware
and the self-deceiving games player.
Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of The Universal Baseball 
Associationi Inc., J. Henry Waugh, Prop. is the tripartite vision the
reader has of Henry. From the point of view of the Association
ballplayers Henry is the power that constitutes them. For his friends
and acquaintances Henry is a somewhat lonely accountant who visits bars,
enjoys country music and has a predilection for games. Through Coover's
tonal presence in the narrative the reader is given the vision of a man
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who becomes so wrapped up in the reality of his Association that he can
no longer distinguish between the real and the imagined. Coover's suc-
cess in mixing these points of view is reflected by the fact that the
reader often finds himself asking which viewpoint is the real.
Out of a void Henry creates order, and that order comes to be
the "real" in his life. The danger of coming to believe in our "fic-
tions," Coover makes plain, is that we often mistake its efficacy for
truthfulness. In this way we come to perceive the world through philo-
sophical/theological "rose-colored glasses" which block our vision of
true reality. The story of the Brunists is one of people driven by
passion and a zeal for pattern to create a "game." The "game" then comes
to be their "reality," At the end of the novel we are left with the
unquestioning games playing of newly converted games players. We are
left with similar images in The Universal Baseball AssociatioInc., 
J.  Henry Waugh, Prop. and The Public Burning.
To be sure, there is an occasional urge on the part of most to
break away from the "pattern," quit the "game," and experience real free-
dom. It is the "rhantom" whispering in one's ear. Henry Waugh felt the
urge severo times, but was afraid of what destroying his "game" would
do to him:
Odd thing about an operation like this league: once you set it in
motion, you were yourself somehow launched into the same orbit; there
was growth in the making of it, development, but there was also a
defining of the outer edges. Moreover, the urge to annihilate --




There is a comfortableness and sense of security in immersing
oneself in a particular "game," But there will always be those "outer
edges" beyond which one is not allowed to go. These 'outer edges" also
block the vision of the games players so that they never confront reality
on its own terms. Coover further wants to say that it is in defending
these "outer edges" against outside threats that games players become
4.nvolved in Inquisitions, pogroms and wars. The "game" becomes so impor-
tant that the games player is willing to forego his one possession --
being alive in the dynamic present -- so that the "game" may continue.
Coover counters this image with self-consciously aware games
players like Hardy Ingram and Paul Trench in The Universal Baseball 
Association, Inc., J. Henry Waugh Prop. Perhaps the consummate games
player in Coover's fiction is Justin Miller, who "plays" with the
Brunists in order to get a good story for his newspaper. More impor-
tantly, Miller is attracted to the Brunists because they afford him the
chance to be a "player" without having to run the risk of commitment.
There is a desire for order and cohesion on Miller's part, but he has
difficulty bringing himself to believe in any one "game." While touring
the mine after the accident, Miller
suffered for one febrile moment the leap and joy and glory of the
state basketball championships -- bright flash of meaning, a possi-
faith in a possible thing: that they could win: and there were
globes of white light and wide open space and a thundering excite-
ment, a fast responsive body, patterns that worked, challenge,
rescue, always a resolution, redemptions tested and proved in the
scoring columns . . . a grace on him. Standing straight, he knocked
his helmet against the roof: drums rolled funerqally, blunt re-
minder, from the insensate earth, of the real. 61
67Coover, The Origin of the Brunists, p. 156.
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We are told later:
Games are what kept Miller going. Games, and the pacifying of
mind and organs. Miller perceived existence as a loose concatena-
tion of separate and ultimately inconsequential instants, each
colored by the actions that preceded it, but each possessed of a
small wanton freedom of its own. Life, then, was a series of ad-
justments to three actions and, if one kept his sense of humor and
produced as many of these actions himself as possible, adjustment
was easier. 68
Miller first gets involved with the Brunists because "as games
went, it was a game, and there was some promise in it." 69 But in
Marcella Bruno he finds a person who touches that which is in him that
desires order aid meaning. Because he wants to believe in the two of
them together, Miller misreads the signs about their relationship.
Miller constructs an orderly sequence of events in his mind in which
Marcella leaves the Brunists, they marry and live happily ever after.
That the "game" he is playing leads him to a misapprehension of reality
is made clear when Marcella leaves him just as she is about to surrender
sexually to him. When forced to make a decision, she chooses to remain
with the Brunists. Just as in the mine, Miller again bangs his head
against the real.
Miller is nearly killed by the Brunists during the chaotic scene
close to the end of the novel. As he recovers in a hospital, Miller
comes to a self-awareness of his "game" with Marcella, which in turn
allows him to recognize that which is really important -- being alive.
While in the hospital Miller is ministered to by a nurse named Happy
68Ib1d., p, 161. 691b1d.
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Bottom, a fellow skeptic and sometime bedmate during the narrative. Al-
though he ignored her during his infatuation with Marcella Bruno, Miller
comes to recognize that what he and Happy have together is more solid
and ultimately more meaningful than what he had with Marcella. Wondering
why she continues to remain open and loving toward him, Miller asks, "Why
did you bother, Happy?"
He expected her to make some crack, but instead she only smiled
and said, "I don't know. I guess because I like the way you laugh."
Yes, there was that. Not the vol9( within and ahead, but the
immediate living space between two. "
Thinking about the role games had played in his life and the
seductive power of pattern, Miller recalls the story of a basketball
teammate of his:
Once Ox had scandalized a whole stadium of fans and players, those
that saw and heard, when, coming into a time-out huddle just after
making a brilliant drive-in shot in a whale of a game up in the state
championships, face dripping sweat and eyes closed, hand on a hard-
on that not even a jockstrap could hold back, he gasped, "Oh Jesus,
I jist wanna jack off!" In the walled in years of datelines that
had followed, whenever for a moment he'd broken out of the pattern,
Miller had remembered Ox's mystical moment, and he was thinking
about it now. 71
Experiencing the dynamic moment is what is really important,
Miller concludes. In doing so one is able to put away the societal and
religious blinders that block a confrontation with reality. It also
sensitizes a person so that he is able to realize the many possibilities




Miller finds with Happy Bottom.
As the novel ends we are left with a parable written by Happy
Bottom which is a good summary of the power that societal and religious
"games" hold over people -- in spite of their lack of content or truth-
fulness -- and points to what should be the proper human response:
The whole affair bogged down entirely in bureaucracy and the impene-
trable paradoxes of behavior, language, and jurisdiction, until at
last one day it occurred to someone (most likely not a child, in
spite of the overwhelming tradition) to ask why the whole thing was
being perpetrated in the first place, and the Divine Judge found
Himself hard put to provide an answer that satisfied even Himself,
having to confess that He was less amused by it than He had thought
He would be. It was therefore agreed to drop it, and the various
Divine Substances took their leave. The only trouble was that by
that time the enormity of the support organization and the goal
hunger of the participants were such that the absented Divine Sub-
stances were never missed. The proceedings, indulging the ever-
lasting lust for perpetuity and stage directions, dragged on happily
through the centuries, the only consolation for those who might have
guessed the true state of affairs being that which the risen Jesus
centuries ago offered to his appalled disciples.72 . .
"Come and have breakfast."
Robert Coover provides the reader with his own conclusion in
a short story titled "The Door." In pondering life and its improba-
bilities, one of the characters says to herself:
Well, it would be a big production, that was already apparent. An
elaborate game, embellished with masks and poetry, a marshalling of
legendary doves and herbs. . . . Though this was a comedy from
which, once entered, you never returned, it nevertheless possessed
its own astonishments and conjurings, its towers ao0 closets, and
even more pathways, more gardens, and more doors. "
One's creative imagination is that which makes life worthwhile.
72Ib1d., p. 512.
73Coover, Pricksons and Descants, p. 18-19.
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It is also that which leads one to order his world by creating patterns,
which in turn may block a true understanding of reality. What one must
do, Coover says, is to not focus one's attention on some pattern out
there" that will order and give meaning to our lives. Rather, one must
focus only on that imaginative aspect of man that is capable of creating
order out of chaos. Perhaps this might better be expressed by saying
Coover advocates being a games player rather than a games player. In
doing so, he says, we are better able to live fulfilling lives -- or at
least better able to get an occasional laugh, which Coover sees as the
most mature human response in a random universe.
CHAPTER II
An Aesthetic Response
Critical response to Coover's fiction is varied. Some have seen
it as the "product of high emotion and dedicated talent." 74 Others feel
his work "cleverly contains emptiness.
" 75 
There is at least one critic
who believes Coover "is a wonderful writer." 76 He is balanced by
another who writes that "Mr. Coover is a young man dedicated to the
77ruthless stamping out of the simple declarative sentence." Overall
critical response to Coover's first novel, The Origin of the Brunists,
was quite encouraging, while his most recent work, The Public Burning,
has sparked bitter denunciations -- including one reviewer who claims
"the novel chokes on its own vomit." 
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Some of the critical remarks are
clearly undeserved. Red Smith, renowned sports columnist, was a reviewer
of The Universal Baseball Association, Inc., J. Henry Waugh, Prop. and
74William Mathes, Review of The Origin of the Brunists, by
Robert Coover, Book Week, IV (Oct. 9, 1966), p. 14.
75
Shaun O'Connell, Review of Pricksongs and Descants, by Robert
Coover, The Nation, CCIX (Dec. 8, 1969), p. 641.
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Geoffrey Wolff, Review of Pricksongs and Descants, by Robert
Coover, Newsweek. LXXIV (Dec. 1, 1969), p. 94.
77Red Smith, Review of The Universal Baseball Association, Inc.,
J. Henry Wau9h, Prop., by Robert Coover, Book World, July 7, 1968, p. 4.
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Pearl K. Bell, Review of The Public Burning, by Robert Coover,
Commentary,LXIV (October, 1977), p. 68.
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saw in it nothing more than an inane baseball book. Norman Podhoretz
and Pearl K. Bell let politics distort their reading of The Pub1ic
Burnin9, thereby seeing it as nothing more than bad history. A wider
reading of his fiction together with more intellectual openness on the
part of reviewers would surely eliminate much of the vitriol that is
thrown in Coover's direction. But even those critics who show a sensi-
tivity to what Coover is about fall short of unqualified endorsement of
his fiction. In fact, there seems to be a general feeling among many
that Coover is not fulfilling the promise he showed in his early work.
Much of the reason for this hesitancy results from the highly conceptual
foundation Coover uses as a writer.
As stated earlier, Coover is first and foremost a thinker. His
philosophical background has led him to draw certain metaphysical con-
clusions about man and his world. Coover's fiction, in turn, is primarily
an aesthetic affirmation of his philosophical/theological stance. Fur-
ther, because of the already discussed nature of his philosophical/theo-
logical views, Coover often appears indecisive when it comes to concrete
decisions that need to be made in concrete situations. As Webster Schott
notes, it often appears that Coover's fiction "cries uncle in the
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clutch." An examination of Coover's approach to the creative literary
task may help us to understand why this appears to be the case.
If a descriptive label were to be placed on Coover's fiction, the
most appropriate would seem to be "anatomy," which according to Wesley
79Webster Schott, Review of The Ori9in of the Brunists, by
Robert Coover, The New York Times Book -Review, Sept. 25, 1966, p. 4.
Kort
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appears to include fiction which arises from an intellectual scheme,
a scheme which is projected outwards and is presented as though it
were an actual state of affairs. An anatomy, then, is a form of
fiction which, like the novel, is oriented to an external world, but
it is so only in appearance. Actually, the external world is cre-
ated and controlled by categories arising from the implied author's
interpretations of what the world reaAy is, what it ought to be, or
what it is almost certain to become.
Coover gives his own expression of what he understands his task
as a writer to be when, in Pricksongs and Descants, he writes in a dedi-
catory address to Cervantes:
Your stories also exemplified the dual nature of all good narrative
art: they struggled against the unconscious mythic residue in human
life and sought to synthesize the unsynthesizable, sallied forth
against adolescent thought-modes and exhausted art forms, and re-
turned home with new complexities.
Like you, we, too, seem to be standing at the end of one age and on
the threshold of another. We, too, have been brought into a blind
alley by the critics and analysts; we, too, suffer from a "literature
of exhaustion," though ironically our nonheroes are no longer tire-
less and tiresome Amadises, but hopelessly defeated and bed-ridden
Quixotes. . . . The novelist uses familiar mythic and historical
forms to combat the content of those forms and to conduct the
reader . . . to the real, away from mystification to clarification,
away from magic to maturity, away from mystery to revelation. And
it is above all to the need for new modes of perception and fictional
forms able to encompass them that I, barber's basin on my head,
address these stories. 8i
The "familiar mythic and historical forms" Coover uses, for the
most part, are Biblical stories and fairytales. In order "to combat the
80Wesley A. Kort, Shriven Selves (Philadelphia: Fortress Press,
1972), p. 3.
81Coover, Pricksongs and Descants, p. 77-79.
54
content of those forms" he tells these familiar stories from differing
perspectives, makes use of literary parody, redefines time and history,
and experiments with narrative voice and points of view.
In his short story "The Brother," Coover tells us of the Bibli-
cal flood from the perspective of one of Noah's brothers .. All too often
we neglect what the flood must have been like for those who drowned.
Similarly, in "J's Marriage" Coover imagines what it might have been like
for Joseph, the husband of Mary and "father" o Jesus, to spend his one
life in a marriage that could not be consumated. In other short stories
Coover uses fairytale characters like Little Red Riding Hood, and Hansel
and Gretel to instruct the reader on the ways of the world and the end
of innocence. In telling these familiar stories from differing perspec-
tives Coover seeks to expand the sensibil 4ties of his reader, opening
his world to other, unthought of possibilities.
The Universal Baseball Association, Inc., J. Henry Waugh, Prop. 
is an excellent example of the use of parody by Coover. As Max Schulz
notes, the no\el parodies both the origin of baseball and the history of
Christianity by means of a dice game, The effect of this ingenious com-
bination of baseball and religion is to challenge in the mind of the
reader "the fabulous, or divine, explanation of the universe. Order,
balance, pattern, and continuity become unavoidably suspect.
. 82 In this
way Coover intends to make his reader aware that differing views of re-
ality exist concurrently with those of his own making.
Coover is especially adept at redefining time and history in his
82Schulz, op. cit., P. 85.
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fiction, By doing so he is able to establish certain patterns and build
a fictive world in the mind of the reader, then "betray" that reader's
fictive experience. Near the end of The Orisin of the Brunists Justin
Miller is attacked by the Brunists during a moment of religious frenzy.
After describing the assault and Miller's loss of consciousness, Coover
ends the section by saying, "Tiger Miller departed from this world,
passing on to his reward." 83 The reader is led to believe that Miller
dies, Miller is resurrected, however, in the epilogue. Coover is per-
fectly content to let the reader believe for a while that Miller is dead.
Coover likes to fool the reader -- or, more precisely, arrange it so the
reader fools himself. Letting the reader fall victim to his own °pattern"
is all a part of Coover's literary program.
In experimenting with narrative voice Coover blurs the distinc-
tion between author and narrator. Maintaining this "blurring' allows his
presence to be felt in much of his work. His tonal presence ranges from
fairly subtle in The Origin  of the Brunists to almost oppressive in The
Public Burning. Coover has even interjected in the midst of narrative
how he, as author, has come to create the narrative. In "The Magic
Poker," one of his finest short fictions, Coover openly acknowledges his
role:
I wander the island, inventing it. I make a sun for it, and tress --
pines and birch and dogwoods and firs -- and cause the water to lap
the pebbles of its abandoned shores. This, and more: I deposiLsha-
dows and dampness, spin webs, and scatter ruins. Yes: ruins.
83Coover, The Origin of the Brunists, p. 474.
84Coover, Pricksongs and Descants, p. 20.
56
"Really there's nothing to it," Coover tells us later about the
creating of the story. "In fact, it's a pleasure." 85 He then is able
to use his overt presence in the narrative to instruct the reader about
the grip imagination holds on author and reader alike:
At times, I forget that this arrangement is my own invention. I
begin to think of the island as somehow real, its objects solid and
intractable, its conditions of ;in not so much an aesthetic design
as an historical denouement. I find myself peering into bhe tea-
kettles, batting at spiderwebs, and contemplating a greenish-gray
growth on the side of a stone parapet. I wonder if others might
wander here without my knowing it; I wonder if I might die and the
teakettle remain. "I have brought two sisters to this invented
island," I say This is no extravagance. It is indeed I who burdens
them with curiosity and history, appetite and rhetoric. If they have
names and griefs, I have provided them. "In fact," I add, "without
me they'd have no cunts." This is not (I interrupt here to tell you
that I have done all that I shall do. I return here to bring you
this news, since this seemed as good a place as any. Though you have
more to face, and even more to suffer from me, this is in fact the
last thing I shall say to you. But can the en,1 be in the miOJle?
Yes, yes, it always is . . . ) meant to alarm, merely to make a truth
manifest -- yet I am myself somewhat alarmed. It is one thing to
discover the shag of hair between my buttocks, quite another to find
myself tugging the tight gold pants off Karen's sister. Or perhaps
it is the same thing, yet troubling in either case. Where does this
illusion come from, this sensation of "hardness" in g,blue teakettle
or an iron poker, golden haunches or a green piano?
It is an ambitious literary program Coover sets for himself. The
end resu'it is fiction that is highly entertaining, extremely erudite and
thought provoking. But it is also fiction which, in the end, is incom-
plete and ultimately unsatisfying. Part of the problem is Coover's style.
The reader does not have to be fooled very often before he approaches
Coover's writing with a bit of skepticism. Coover's tonal presence in
the narrative also gives the reader a feeling of being lectured to rather
85Ibid„ p. 22. 86Ibid,, p. 33-34.
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than being ushered into a fictive experience, This may, indeed, be what
Coover intends, but it makes for "unbelievable" fiction. To he enter-
taining is a laudable achievement, and Coover succeeds magnificently in
delighting the mind of his reader. A total fictive experience, however,
calls for the narrative elements of tone, atmosphere, plot and character
to construct a fictive world in which the reader temporarily might be-
lieve. This calls for fiction that reaches not only the mind but the
heart of the reader. Coover's fictinn, it would appear, fails to do so.
Characterization, especially, suffers in his fiction as charac-
ters are created to fulfill polemical missions in establishing Coover's
philosophical/theological beliefs. The end result are characters who
are one-dimensional, much like characters in a morality play. There are
times, however, when Coover seeks to breathe more life into a character
to make him more recognizably human to the reader. Examples are Justin
Miller and Vince Bonali in The Origin of the Brunists, Henry Waugh in The
Universal Baseball Association, Inc., J. Henry Wauah, Prop., and Richard
Nixon in The Public Burning. But even these characters lose their "human-
ness" by being openly manipulated to represent certain philosophical/
theological viewpoints. Quality fiction is much more subtle. The true
artist is the one who is able to present his characters and, by use of
the other narrative elements, lead the reader to see them in certain
ways. Coover has a tendency to tell the reader what to think about a
particular character, and the reader does not need that.
John Gardner, in his book On Moral Fiction, speaks of how an ar-
tist comes to write great fiction. An important factor, he says, is for
the writer to approach characters as he would real people and allow them
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to react realistically to the situations in the narrative. To do this
properly, the ,oiter must not be so fully committed to a particular
scheme that the character is no longer able to act autonomously of the
author. The writer, in other words, should put himself in a position
where even he can be surprised by the turn of events in the narrative. 87
The writer who approaches literature with a view toward expressing cer-
tain conceptual ideas, as Coover appears to do, generally creates charac-
ters that do not have the spontaneity and competencies of real people.
They have specific jobs to do, and Coover sees to it that they do them.
Gardner. a highly successful novelist himself, is somewhat biased
when he talks about the humanizing influence creative writing has on an
author. What he says is true -- as far as it goes. But the reader is
also a benefactor of the humanizing influence of literature. Through the
use of language people are able to develop competencies in understanding
the most ineffable facets of human action. According to Paul Holmer, it
is by the use of language that we are "enabled and empowered to see, to
discern, to know." 88 Literature is a language-medium for Holmer, but
not theory. In fact, he believes no theory
can ever substitute for the ad hoc and widely diversified range of
competencies that are required to think, talk, and feel in ways that
such a use of language proposes. . . The ad hoc mode of explaining
must not be abrogated because there are "caused" thoughts and inordi-
nate emotions that deceive us. We must become more competent and
that means more sensitive, discriminating, more apt with descriptions,
87John Gardner, On Moral Fiction (New York: Basic Books, Inc.,
1978), p. 113-114.
88Paul Holmer, C.S. Lewis: The  Shape of his Faith and Thousht
(New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1916), p. 28.
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and more acute in feeling. , . Emotion words require competencies
that are rare. Acquiring those competencies is something that a rich
life çn supply. But a literary and esthetic experience can do it
too. "
Thus literature should be a means by which the reader may learn
mo+e about himself as a person -- not only about his thinking person, but
his feeling person as well.
Humans are amazingly complex, and engage in all sorts of acti-
vities that require competencies both in verifiable quantitative judge-
ments and non-verifiable qualitative judgements. Because of its concep-
tual foundation Loover's fiction engages only a part of the human psyche,
leaving the reader still unsatisfied. Really good fiction, conversely,
is able to engage the reader at all levels. Perhaps, in time, Robert
Coover will be able to do the same.
A Philosophical Response
Coover a6dresses himself to several philosophical and theolo-
gical issues which need to be examined more closely. Coover correctly
sees language as a medium by which man comes to an understanding of his
world. His concern with language and its possibilities bespeaks an in-
terest in contemporary linguistic philosophy, and the work of Ludwig
Wittgenstein may instructively be called upon in a discussion of Coover's
view of language. Coover also displays insight in his approach to theo-
logical issues, seeing religious experience as something that goes beyond
language. A Kierkegaardian model will help us to see that Coover
89Ibid., p. 30.
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expresses some views which can be considered theologically sound (e.g.
his view of history and his criticism of "common sense"), in spite of
his refusal to make a personal commitment toward the "content" of
Christianity that a personal faith would require.
Coover is the heir of a philosophical tradition that includes
Immanuel Kant and logical positivism. After being shaken from his "dog-
matic slumber" by the English empiricist David Hume, Kant wrote his
Critique of Pure Reason as a synthesis of the best that empiricism and
rationalism had to offer. In his view, every act of knowledge showed a
contribution of both experience and reason. Kant called his work a
second "Copernican Revolution." Up to that time, philosophy had generally
held that the mind was dependent upon the world "out there" for its view
of reality. Kant turned this around, saying that the epistemological
center of the world was the mind. If the mind was structured a certain
way, in other words, the world would "appear" as the mind's structure
dictated. In order to function, the mind needed raw sense data which
Kant labeled "percepts." The original formation of raw sense data in
the mind were by means of the "forms of sensibility," which are time and
space. The temporally and spacially dressed percepts then passed through
the "categories of the understanding," Kant's concession to rationalism,
in order to become the experienced "transcendental unity of apperception."
Although he considered himself a synthesis of empiricism and rationalism,
Kant's dependence on raw sense data to feed the mind indicates he ulti-
r.lately came down on the side of empiricism. It may be that the mind
orders one's experience, Kant was saying, but there had to be an appro-
priation of the dino an sich For there to be an experience at all. A
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question that needs to be raised is what the ding an sich, the percept,
of an experience of "good," 'beauty," "soul" or "God" would be. One
possible answer was provided by the logical positivists.
Logical positivism was a result of the stunning advances of
science during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Because of those
advances, the methods of science were being adopted in all areas as each
discipline felt compelled to be more science-like, more empirical. A
turther result of the influence of science and an ever more strict em-
piricism was that people began to look askance at words which had no
verifiable referent. There was a growing uncomfortableness in talking
about the "good," the "beautiful," "soul" and "God." Logical positivism
rose out of this cultural milieu, using as the foundation of its linguis-
tic program the "verification principle" (the meaning of a sentence is
its method of verification), which denied meaning and significance to
any statement that could not be either analytically or empirically veri-
fied. The positivist position as regards "God" was expressed by A.J.
Ayer when he wrote:
It is now generally admitted, at any rate by philosophers, that
the existence of a being having the attributes which define the god
of any non-animistic religion cannot be demons,.rably proved.
If a mystic admits that the object of his vision is something which
cannot be described, then he must also admit that he is bound to
talk nonsense when he describes it.
The theist, like the moralist, may believe that his experiences are
cognitive experiences, but, unless he can formulate his "knowledge"
in propositions that are mpirically verifiable, we may be sure that
he is deceiving himself.
90
Alfred Jules Ayer, Langua,pe, Truth and Logic (New York: Dover
Publications, Inc., 1952), p. 114, 118, 120.
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For the strict positivist, then, there is no din) an sich to
experience. At most, non-verifiable statements tell us something about
the psychological state of the speaker. From a philosophical viewpoint,
such statements are nothing more than metaphysical babble,
It was in this atmosphere of positivism that Ludwig Wittgenstein
worked. Wittgenstein's first hook, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, as
adoptEd by positivists because they sav in his "picture theory" of lan-
guage a confirmation of their own philosophical views. Recent commen-
tators on the book, however, have argued the anti-positivist thrust of
the work, saying Wittgenstein's ultimate interest was to limit science --
to not allow science to judge non-scientific matters. Wittgenstein
lumped together ethics, aesthetics and religion into what in the Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus he called the "mystical," a realm where language
was inadequate. He claimed that all values were outside the empirically
experienced world and that one could not explain a value by means of
what exists. So far, it is easy to see why positivists were attracted
to Wittgenstein. There is a fundamental difference, however. When Ayer
talked about the nonsense of non-verifiable descriptions he literally
meant non-sense. When Wittgenstein talked about the nonsense of non-
verifiable descriptions hE meant the most important things in life.
Wittgenstein was concerned in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 
about what he considered a confusion between that which is of language
and that which is beyond the limits of language (e.g. God, ethics, aes-
thetics, the "mystical"). At one point Wittgenstein wrote: "There are,
indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves 
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manifest. They are what is mystical," 91
It is as if there were an island that comprised all that is the
world, and a sea which surrounded the island and contained all that is
considered the "mystical." Everything on the island is verifiably de-
scribable but relatively trivial, in Wittgenstein's view, while in the
sea is all that is really important. The edge of the island represents
the limits of language. One can describe a fact on the island (e.g. "My
mother died today"), then drawing from one's attitude toward the sea
make a statement of faith by which to view the described fact (e.g. "What
a random universe we live in" or "She now has comfort in Abraham's
bosom"). This is what Wittgenstein meant by saying the "mystical" could
not be put into words; it could only be made manifest. For Wittgenstein,
knowledge and values had more of a connection with what we do rather than
what we think. His was an answer to those positivists who made every-
thing logical propositions; his message was that we should keep science
in its proper place and not try to express the "mystical" in terms of
science.
Soren Kierkegaard set forth a similar viewpoint in his litera-
tare. In resisting Hegelianism, the dominant philosophical movement
of the period, Kierkegaard sought to return man to an awareness of "the
yawning abyss of quality in the difference between God and man," 92 By
9
iLudwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Loqico-Philosophicus, trans.
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way of background, Hegel's work was a speculative attempt to systematize
all thought and being into an Idealistic philosophy. Goaded by histori-
cal events, intoxicated by the spirit of progress toward an ultimate
telos as engendered in ever-ouickening scientific discovery and techno-
logical advance, and encouraged by the facile use of his dialectic, Hegel
formulated a system in which Absolute Spirit (i.e. God) is in the ongoing
process of making itself known in-and-for-itself upon the stage of human
history. By means of his speculative system, Hegel sought to subsume
all particularity into one, grandiose, absolute ideality.
The danger of Hegelianism, according to Kierkegaard, was that it
made all things a matter of conceptual understanding. Although more
speculative than empirical science, Hegelianism tended to "objectify"
whatever it touched. The effect was to turi nol-verifiable descriptions
(Wittgenstein's "mystical") into "objects" of knowledge. Kierkegaard
felt that, as a result of Hegelianism, the distinction between ethics/
religion and natural science/speculative thought had been blurred. In
the resultant confusion people no longer knew what it was to be truly
ethical or truly religious. Kierkegaard pointed to this "mixing" and its
debilitating effects when he wrote:
The entire Christian terminology has been appropriated by specu-
lative thought to its own purposes, under the assumption that specu-
lative thought and Christianity are identical. Even newspapers use
the highest dogmatic expressions as genial ingredients in the jour-
nalistic pot-pourri. While the statesmen look forward with appre-
hension to a threatened general bankruptcy of the governments, we
face peraaps a far more serious bankruptcy in the world of the
spirit; for the concepts have gradually been emasculated, and the
words have been made to mean anything and everything, so that the
disputes are sometimes as ridiculous as the agreements. . . . Just
as a toothless old man is reduced to mumbling through the gums, so
modern discourse about Christianity has lost the vigor that can come
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only from an energetically sustOmed terminology, and the whole is
reduced to a toothless twaddle.
According to Emil Fackenheim, "the actual existence of one spe-
cific historical world is the cardinal condition without which, by its
own admission and insistence, the Hegelian philosophy cannot reach its
. 94ultimate goal. History was tamed by Hegel, but in order to keep
history in tether the historical and logical significance of Jesus had
to be no more and no less than any other historical fact. Christianity
had to be seen as an historical development, necessary only as another
step in the ongoing dialectic of Absolute Spirit. In his effort to main-
tain what he felt to be the fundamental unity of human reason and faith,
Hegel gave Christianity an objective character built upon a broad foun-
dation of philosophy and science.
The insidious danger of such thinking, according to Kierkegaard,
was that it gave the illusion of having "knowledge" of Jesus and of
Christianity. influenced by such thinking, people were becoming objec-
tified to the point where they felt a genuine human being was a scholarly
person who did not engage himself in religion, but thought about reli-
gion -- did not engage himself in ethical behavior, but thought about
ethics. The purpose of such scholarly discourse was not the improvement
of one's individual life, but a discursive treatment of philosophical
and religious themes as if such a discourse would improve one's life. In
93Soren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans.
David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1974), p. 324-325.
Emil Fackenheim, The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), p. 232.
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his effort to discredit the Hegelian scheme, Kierkegaard argued that
historical events were not necessary 'Jut possible, and that our knowledge
of historical events could, at best, be only an approximation. "If all
the angels in heaven were to put their heads together," he wrote, "they
could still bring to pass only an approximation, because an approximation
95is the only certainty attainable for historical knowledge. In this
way Kierkegaard sought to disrupt the comfortable relationship in modern
Christendom brought about by a Hegelian concept of history. But
Kierkegaard had still to hurdle Lessing's query about how God's revela-
tion in the Christ-event could be seen as eterrally true if it were based
upon an historical app-oximation. Kierkegaard's answer is the subject
of Philosophical Fra.pments.
By means of a "thought experiment" Kierkegaard attempted to show
in this work that New Testament Christianity was qualitatively different
from philosophical idealism and that the "truth" of New Testament
Christianity was appropriated in a different manner than the "truth"
of philosophical idealism. He also sought to clarify by means of what
Wittgenstein would call "grammatical remarks" the differing categories
of New Testament Christianity and philosophical idealism, with the hope
of eliminating the "category errors" he felt endemic to Hegelianism.
Philosophical idealism was represented in this "thought experi-
ment" by Socrates, the midwife who aided man in coming to "recollect"
the truth that had been within him all along. The danger of this maieutic
notion for Christianity was that it made Jesus into a teacher who, though
95Kierkegaard, Concluding  Unscientific Postscript, p. 31.
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necessary to bring his subject to an understanding of the truth within
him, was no longer necessary once the subject was made aware of his
natural participation in the truth. As an alternative to this Hegelian
model of truth, Kierkegaard posited that truth in religious matters was
unique, that man was divorced from religious truth because of his sin
(which, for Kierkegaard, was not a doctrine but a state of existence) and
was unable to appropriate religious truth by his own means, that Jesus
was a teacher who conferred religious truth upon man (making the teacher
of central importance), that faith was an organ of knowing religious
truth, and that in a moment of decision one's life could be changed.
Kierkegaard also posited the paradoxicalness of Jesus being both
absolutely other than man (i.e. God) and not absolutely other than man,
saying that the Christ-event was the Absolute Paradox about which "thought
cannot think." 
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In saying the paradox was absolute, Kierkegaard was
saying the paradox was irresolvable because of the uniqueness of the
particular paradox in question. The Incarnation could only be seen as
contradictory to the objective reason of an existing individual, and
therefore rejected as an offense. But Kierkegaard has "assumed a new
organ: Faith; a new presupposition: the Moment; and a new Teacher:
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the God in Time." Thus, for Kierkegaard, the Christ-event never "made
sense" the way the Hegelians would like. When confronted with the Incar-
nation one had to respond by saying either, "This is absurd, and I don't
96c,,oren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, trans. David




believe it," or by saying, This is absurd, but I believe it."
In Concluding Unscientific Postscript Kierkegaard discussed the
dynamics of the "leap of faith" that allowed one to appropriate an
"absurdity" as truth, and in the process coined the famous motto: Truth
is Subjectivity. It was in this volume that he sought to answer the
question of how an individual was to become a Christian. At one point
Kierkegaard wrote: "An objective uncertainty held fast in an appropri-
ation process of the most passionate inwardness is the truth, the highest
truth attainable for an existing individual. 
98 This statement has left
many readers bewildered, and debate continues as to whether Kierkegaard
was really being serious when he wrote it. It is always dangerous not
to take Kierkegaard seriously, but the quote should certainly not be used
as a justification for an unbridled subjectivism as some have done. What
Kierkegaard was speaking of here was a special kind of truth -- an exis-
tential truth that was not purely conceptual (like finding out the truth
of who sells the cheapest cars in town) but was known only through one's
activity.
The nature of ethical and religious truth is such that it is
incapable of being reduced to empirical demonstrations and communicated
to another directly. By contrast, science uses consensus metnods for
ascertaining truth, and a lot of what passes as "common sense" truth is
inculcated by societal consensus. Kierkegaard appears to be saying, how-
ever, that there are areas of life for an individual that are outside
consensus methods of finding truth. His distinction between "crowd" and
98Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 182.
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"individual" is one between those who allow consensus methods to deter-
mine their ethical/religious attitudes and those who refuse to allow
consensus methods to hold sway over them. As an individual, one appro-
priates the truth subjectively so that rather than the truth being an
object of thought it becomes a mode of action or a manner of existence.
A subjective thinker is an engaged thinker who lives the truth, and
accepts the sense of risk that accompanies his "leap of faith."
Robert Coover is very much in the Kantian tradition by placing
the mind of man at the epistemological center of the world. In saying
that man is ultimately a sort of "games player" Coover is saying the
"appearance" of the world is dependent more upon the mind of man than
upon the world itself. Of course, Kant is particularly concerned with
the structure of mind whereas Coover is more interested in the creative
and imaginative powers of the mind. In speaking about emotions, Coover
once remarked in an interview:
I was talking to a computer expert and he explained one of the prob-
lems they had in developing the computer the way they deveoped it is
that they modeled it off the notion of the human brain as being a
central . . . organizing system which sends out messages and receives
messages back. . . . And he said in reality they're discovering ways
of running the computer better. And that makes them wonder if they've
got the right idea about the brain. . . . Our notion of the human
brain may be false. It may be that we think simultaneously with the
entire body, that the finger's response to heat is a thinking re-
sponse in the finger in a real way. The whole organism is a sentient
being. And thought of inAhose terms, the possibility compromises
our notion of the brain.
There is little talk of rational "categories of the understanding"
99Hertzel, "An Interview with Robert Coover," p. 27.
70
in this. For Coover, it is our songs, myths, and rituals that give our
world its orderly appearance; by means of them one is able to experience
the world in a sentient manner and thereby think about and make sense of
it. Indeed, Coover would probably say it is the power of song, myth and
ritual that compels Kant to go beyond the Critique of Pure Reason to
write the Critique of Practical Reason. It is in the second book that
Kant succumbs to human needs and sets up a framework that allows him to
again speak of ethics and God.
Coover does not say what "content" stands behind one's songs,
myths and rituals, but in talking about the power they have over man he
points in the direction of language. Coover appears to accept the posi-
tivistic notion that non-verifiable descriptions are nonsensical. Reli-
gions do not represent a true state of affairs, according to Coover, but
are merely means by which man is able to order his experience and make
it meaningful. Coover further shares with the positivists the notion
that any "God-talk' says more about the psychological state of the
speaker than it does about something "out there." In writing about one
of the young Brunists, Coover says:
It took literally hours and hours of meditation and humility and
self-searching and seeking without thought, but once in awhile some-
thing happened, something really unbelievable, it was like -- like
a light turning on inside. Afterwards, after this kind of terribly
exhilarating experience, he couldn't explain it, ornven describe
it, it was beyond the capacity of human language. "
This passage exhibits both the psychological nature of the ex-
perience as well as the Wittgensteinian notion that the experience is
10 °Coover, The Origln of the Brunists, p. 227-228.
71
beyond the grasp of language. However, through the use of legend, song
and ritual -- language mediums -- one is able to transform that gossamer
experience into a more objectified religious practice among Jther be-
lievers, thereby making the experience more "real," Coover seems to be
saying in his fiction that non-verifiable descriptions may have no
"truth-content," but they are nevertheless significant to man.
In a move similar to Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard, Coover criti-
cizes in his fiction the use of that which exists to explain non-veri-
fiable descriptions. It is in this vein that he points to the short-
comings of "history" and "common sense." In The Universal Baseball 
Association, Inc. J. Henry Waugh, Prop., Coover writes: "History: in
the end, you can never prove a thing." 
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It certainly does not stop
people from trying, however. In spite of the fact that, as Kierkegaard
warns, the most that can be reaped from history is an approximation, his-
tory is forever being used as a guarantor of various "patterns" of life --
including religious "truth," Such a view objectifies religious "truth"
and makes it available to all as an object of knowledge. It neglects the
subjective character of faith and transforms "individuals" into members
of the "crowd." Newspapers -- dbout which both Coover and Kierkegaard
have few kird words -- also tend to objectify experience and sink indi-
viduals into the mass. In The Oriclin of the Brunists a "Common Sense
Committee" made up of the town's leading citizens is set up to resist the
growing strength of the Brunists. In using their communal "common sense"
to make judgements about religious matters, they resort to consensus
101Coover, The Universal Baseball Association, Inc., J. Henry
Waugh, Prop., p. 224.
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methods of arriving at truth. And, as Kierkegaard argued earlier, con-
sensus methods of finding truth are inadequate in certain areas of life.
The "truth" of Christianity, for example, is simply not amenable to con-
sensus.
Thus Coover shares with Kant the notion that man is at the epis-
temological center of the world; shares with the positivists a skepticism
about non-verifiable descriptions; shares with Wittgenstein a belief that
non-verifiable descriptions are, in their own way, important to man;
shares with both Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard the notion that non-verifi-
able descriptions may oot be explained by what exists in the world; and
shares with Kierkegaard a skepticism about the "truth-seeking" capabili-
ties of "history" and "common sense," But while such ideas lead
Kierkegaard, for one, to a profound understanding of faith and God,
Coover is led to view the world as random and man as an order-seeking
"games player,"
A Theological Response
Coover is incapable of accepting the "truth" of any one religious
interpretation of the world -- perhaps because he is too "knowing." In
fact, Coover pointedly aLtacks religious notions at times. In his short
story "A Pedestrian Accident," which concerns a young man named Paul who
is hit by a truck and then must suffer the various pyrotechnics of on-
lookers, Coover writes at the end:
For an instant, the earth upended again, and Paul found himself hung
on the street, a target for the millions of raindarts somebody out
in the night was throwing at him. There's nobody out there, he re-
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minded himself, and that set the earth right again. 
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The scene is remindful of the Crucifixion. In recognizing that "there's
nobody out there" the world is righted and seen for what it really is.
Indeed, there is no one out there as far as Coover is concerned. But,
as John Gardner notes, his assertion is "no more provable, except by
faith, than the contrary assertion of Coover's Baptist-country child-
hood.' 10
3
Wittgenstein provided a different sort of answer. Although he,
too, could not accept the "content" of any one religious interpretation
of the world, he always maintained a deep -- even longing -- respect for
religious views. This tendency in Wittgenstein was expanded in his se-
cond book, Philosophical Investigations,
In moving from the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus to Philoso-
phical  Investigations Wittgenstein moved from a belief that there is
something about language itself that reflects the world (i.e. logical
multiplicity) to the belief that it is what people do with language --
hnw it is used, in other words -- that gives language its meaning. In
the Philosophical Investgations he made the critical point that "it is
what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the lan-
guage they use. This is not agreement in opinions but in form of
l ife.  104 Elsewhere he wrote: "What has to be accepted, the (liven,
102Coover, Pricksongs and Descants, p. 205.
103Gardner, op. cit., p. 76.
10 4Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans.
G.E.M. Anscombe (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1968), p. 88.
74
is -- so one could say -- forms of life." 
105 In other words, even if
there are disagreements on particular subjects there are at least cer-
tain agreed upon conventions by users of a language on how words are to
be used, and these agreed upon conventions merge the users of that lan-
guage into a shared "form of life" -- a shared community.
There are many uses of language and many different "forms of
life" -- including religious discourse. 
106 
What one must do to "under-
stand" the "form of life" that is a part of religious language, according
to Wittgenstein, is not strain oneself looking for an "essence" behind
the words but to describe accurately the way the words are used during
religious discourse (i.e. This is what people do; they behave in the
way I have described"). It is important to note, at this time, that
even though religious discourse does not have an empirical referent as
the positivists would prefer, it is still meaningful language for its
users. Religious language -- "God-talk" -- tells us something in spite
of its lack of an empirical referent. Wittgenstein gave the following
parable, as told by Norman Malcolm:
Imagine that there is a town in which the policemen are required to
obtain information from each inhabitant, e.g. his age, where ne came
from, and what work he does. A record is kept of this information
and some use is made of it. Occasionallj when a policeman questions
an inhabitant he discovers that the latter does not do any work. The
policeman enters this fact on the record, because this too is a use-
ful piece of information about the man!
The application of the parable is, I Palcoq think, that if you
1051 bid., p. 226.
106Norman Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 72.
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do not understand a statement, then to discover that it has no veri-
fication is an important piece of information about it and makes you
understand it better. That is to say, you understand it better; you
do not find out that there is nothing to understand. lul
Although not overtly religious himself, Wittgenstein was fasci-
nated by religion and was very impressed by such religious writers as
St. Augustine, Dostoevski, Tolstoy and Kierkegaard (whom he referred to
as a "really religious" person who was "too deep" for him). He also
surrounded himself with students who were profound in their faith. 
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At the same time, he was very critical of "proofs" of God's existence as
well as attempts at providing rational foundations for religion. For
Wittgenstein, rational foundations should be used in those "forms of
life" that have need of rational foundations, while the "mystical" "forms
of life" should be manifested in the living -- and discourse -- of one's
life. In an enlightening response to Kierkegaard's remark that "How can
it be that Christ does not exist, since I know that he has saved me?",
Wittgenstein exclaimed: "You see! It isn't a question of proving any-
thins." 109
During a visit to Milligan College, Tennessee, in 1970, O.K.
Bouwsma shared some of his personal memories of Wittgenstein, with whom
he had studied in England. Bouwsma told of the time their conversation
turned to religious "truth," whereupon Wittgenstein related the following
parable (paraphrased by the present writer):





saying 'stop," "go," ayield," etc., and rigid rules for one's con-
duct on the road, As one leaves the city, however, the road begins
to narrow and the signs become less frequent. Farther outside the
city the road becomes nothing more than a dirt path and there are
no more signs. Finally, one finds himself in the wilderness where
there are no pat
e
ios no signs and no lights -- except the light of
ti one's own mind.
Bouwsma said he was, at first, very perplexed by the parable,
and told Wittgenstein he did not know what use to make of of it.
Wittgenstein then added: "It's like this -- I say if you find a light,
follow it, for it may be right. But don't look for light in the city."
Bouwsma then explained to those gathered at Milligan College
that night what he felt the parable meant. Language is like life in the
city, he explained, and is immersed in rules and signs which tell how to
proceed. As one begins to leave language, however, he opens himself up
to experiences of the "mystical" which can then only be shown, never
defined.
Bouwsma was then asked by a philosophy professor present if
Wittgenstein ever changed his position in regard to the enigmatic state-
ment at the end of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: "What we cannot
speak about we must pass over in silence.
. 111 Bouwsma responded by
saying that Wittgenstein's use of the word "silence" was similar to
what Kierkegaard meant by silence. "I cannot share my faith with you
llaDr. Bouwsma shared his reminiscences about Wittgenstein in an
informal setting while visiting Milligan College, Tennessee, for a series
of lectures. Although a video tape recording of his remarks was made (it
is in the care of Dr. C. Robert Wetzel at Milligan College), his and other
remarks from this meeting are the recollections of the present writer.
While the quoted material may not be "literally" correct, they most cer-
tainly convey the correct meaning.
11 
1Wittgenstein, Tractatus Looico-Philosophicus, p. 74.
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in language,' Bouwsma said, "for my faith is between me and my God --
and before God I am silent,"
One is reminded of a remark by Kierkegaard:
When Amor left Psyche he said to her: If you remain silent you
will be the mother of a divine child, but only of a human child if
you betray the secret. Everyone who knows how to remain silent be-
comes a divine child, for in silence lies the recollection of his
divine origin; the one who talks becomes a man. How few know how
to keep silent -- how few even know what silence means. 112
Wittgenstein remained neutral as to what the "content" of tne
"mystical" ought to be, but he did so to maintain what he felt was the
internal integrity of various "forms of life." His value lay in showing
that ethics, aesthetics and religion are spheres of life that are not
encompassed in thought, but in action -- they involve things we, as
humans, do and is reflected in language.
112Kierkegaard, The Journals of Soren Kierkegaard, p. 107.
CHAPTER III
A Final Evaluation
Robert Coover's fiction maintains a strong anthropocentric view
of the world. His conclusion is that one can be either a self-conscious
"games player" content with his station in life, or a "games player" so
wrapped up in his "game" that he is no longer able to confront reality
as it is. Coover speaks of religion in much of his fiction, but always
from the perspective of man as myth-maker. Coover does not concern him-
self with the "content" of religion -- both because there are no tools
to ascertain such a "content," and because he is rot at all convinced
there is a "content" to be ascertained.
For those who take a phenomenological approach to religion,
Coover's view of man as a myth-making "games player" would be enough to
label him a "religious writer." Indeed, many "death of God" theologians
would feel quite comfortable with Coover's views. But surely most will
see his work as an attack on religion in general and Christianity in
particular. There will be those who will label Coover an "atheist," and
an argument can certainly be made for that claim. But care must be exer-
cised when using that word. Coover does write extensively on religious
themes; and it just could be that atheists and theists are not the oppo-
sites that some make them out to be. As Roger Shinn perceptively notes:
We often put people on a religious spectrum. At the extreme left is
the atheist who believes nothing. Then, moving right, we place
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groups who successively believe more and more, until at the very
right we place the true Christian. But perhaps the rigorous atheist
is closer to God th0Q,those who believe a little, or even than many
who believe a lot. I"
While the terms "atheist" and "theist" are surely opposites in their
logical use, in practice the atheist who is constantly wrestling with
God -- as Coover does -- may be closer to God than the person who sits
in church every Sunday without ever having been challenged deep down
about what it means to trust in God.
Apart from whatever religious label we may want to apply to him,
we must still decide whether Coover's vision of man as myth-making "games
player" is an adequate one. Again, a Kierkegaardian model seems appro-
priate.
In Sickness Unto Death, Kierkegaard describes man as "a synthesis
of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of free-
dom and necessity." 
114 There is that aspect of man that is bound to the
earth in space and time as well as that aspect which allows him intel-
lectually to reach beyond his own grasp in possibility. An important
feature of this synthesis is that one has many possibilities open to
him -- in fact, the only limiting factor on his possibilities is his con-
creteness in space and time.
The task for a man is to bring his possibilities to actuality.
113Roger L. Shinn, The Existentialist Posture (New York: Associ-
ation Press, 1970), p. 72.
114Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling & Sickness Unto Death,
trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974),
p. 146.
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To do this, one must make choices by an act of the will. Choices are
made in freedom, but once the choice is made to bring a certain possi-
bility to actuality other possibilities are then excluded from being
actualized. One who chooses to become an apprentice bricklayer, for
example, eliminates for all practical purposes the possibility of his
becoming a college philosophy professor. Thus one is by nature a bundle
of possibilities limited only by his concreteness in space and time, yet
determined by his free choices.
By what should one's free choices be guided? Eternal truths
cannot be used as guideposts by natural man because one's temporality
creates uncertainty in the veracity of these eternal truths. One cannot
appeal to hard facts because the ability of self-transcendence within a
man dissolves brute facts into a whirl of possibilities. To what, then,
can one appeal as an authority that one's free choices are proper ones?
There is nothing. But then what assurance has one that he has not made
mistakes in his free choices? He has none. It becomes obvious that to
make free choices under such conditions leaves one open to feelings of
regret and despair. In fact, feelings of regret and despair are unavoid-
able. One's entrapment in regret and despair is a condition one becomes
conscious of in experiencing the world in which he must exist.
Kierkegaard calls despair the "sickness unto death," and further
says, "the possibility of this sickness is man's advantage over the
beast." 115 But "if one is to talk of despair," Kierkegaard believes




concept to grasp, and Kierkegaard's opaque writing style makes it even
more so. Kierkegaard equates "spirit with the "self," and then rheto-
rically asks: But what is the self? The self is a relation that re-
lates itself to its own self." 117 In a word, the self is a self-
consciousness which joins one's concreteness in space and time together
with one's capacity to transcend himself in possibility, and asserts
itself as spirit both conscious of itself and free in respect to itself.
According to Kierkegaard, the degree of self-consciousness, or
freedom, in an individual will determine the intensity of despair that
individual will experience. 118 Kierkegaard regards the natural man as
an example of the lowest degree of self-consciousness, as one who "is
ignorant of what the dreadful truly is." 119 Kierkegaard also refers to
this lowest degree of self-consciousness as "a sort of innocence ENhid]
does not even know that there is a such thing as despair. 120
In Sickness Unto Death Kierkegaard tries to show the development
of despair with respect to consciousness, until he reaches that penulti-
mate level where one is conscious of his despair, of his existing posi-
tion in the world, and is enraged that he is forced to suffer in such a
way. One's awareness of his existing position in the world results in
the despairer consciously initiating an attitude of "revolt" against the
world as it is.
Revolting against the whole of existence, [defiant despair] thinks it






its goodness. This proof the despairer thinks he himself is, and
that is what he wills himself to be, therefore he wills to be him-
self, himself with his torment, in orftr with this torment to pro-
test against the whole of existence.
But Kierkegaard sees man as potentially more than a defiant
despairer, for he sees a possibility of a cure for despair. This cure
is Faith -- faith in a creator God, faith in the paradoxical Incarnation,
and faith in being what one is transparently before God. To approach
this kind of faith, Kierkegaard claims, one must develop self-conscious-
ness and move through the stages of despair. This is the dialectical
nature of despair: "So then it is an infinite advantage to be able to
despair; and yet it is not only the greatest misfortune and misery to
be in despair; no, it is perdition.
 122 Still later Kierkegaard writes:
"One who without affectation says that he is in despair is after all a
little bit nearer, a dialectical step nearer to being cured than all
those who are not regarded and do not regard themselves as being in
despair.  123 Further, Kierkegaard states:
Only that man's life is wasted who lived or, so deceived by the joys
of life or by its sorrows that he never became eternally and deci-
sively conscious of himself as spirit, as self, or (what is the same
thing) never became aware and in the deepest sense received an im-
pression of the fact that there is a God, and that he, he himself,
his self, exists before this God, which gain of infinity is never
attained except through despair. 124
Kierkegaard describes despair as "the disrelationship in a rela-







manifested in the lack of correspondence between the realm of soul
(which, for Kierkegaard, is infinity and possibility) and the realm of
body (which is finitude and necessity). He is careful to point out that
despair is not itself the lack o correspondence between body and soul,
for to do so would be to say that despair is "something inherent in human
nature . , that befell a man . . like an illness . . . or like death
which is the lot of all." 
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If such were the case there would be just
cause for rebellion on the part of man because there would be no escaping
the injustice that would be inherent in existence. Kierkegaard does not
stop here, however, because he believes there is an escape, and the es-
cape is faith in God.
Kierkegaard writes at one point that despair comes "from the
relation wherein the synthesis relates itself to itself, in that God who
made man a relationship lets this go as it were out of His hand." 127
In other words, creator God made man a synthesis of body and soul, and
rather than use His omnipotence to limit man by determining what he will
be, He simply let go, thus giving man his freedom. One may return to
God, but to do so one must exercise his freedom in such a way that he
makes the possibility of his return to God an actuality. This can be an
awesome burden for man, for it means one must individually bear responsi-
bility for the consequences of his free choices.
Robert Coover appears to have made his choice, and it does not
include a return to God. But contrary to Kierkegaard, Coover does not





think of himself as despairing. Coover does agree, however, in de-
scribing man as existing within a tension. There are those somatic
characteristics of man that bound him in space and time, as well as the
creative imagination of man which allows him intellectually to transcend
space and time limitations. In his somatic characteristics man partici-
pates in what Coover considers the randomness of the universe. Through
creative imagination man is able to evoke order and meaning out of that
randomness.
Perhaps the most difficult admission an individual can make
psychologically is that one day he will die. Everyone recognizes the
objective fact of death, but few are capable of the deeply subjective
awareness that at some time in the future "I will no longer exist." It
is a scary thought. The fact of death is, perhaps, the most compelling
evidence for the world's randomness. In an effort to avoid this deeply
subjective awareness of one's own death man creates "games" that order
and sacralize his world. Thus, even death may be co-opted by the crea-
tive imagination of man -- its stark reality diminished by various "pat-
terns" of life. According to Coover, such "games players" become so
immersed in their "game" that they are no longer able to encounter the
world as it actually is. Coover feels that such "games players" live
inauthentic lives of willful self-deception.
In contrast to this image of man, Coover advocates a self-con-
scious "games player" who realizes the kind of "game" he is playing and
why the "game" needs to be played. Such an awareness opens an individual
to the myriad opportunities of the dynamic present and allows him to
experience more fully all the joys life has to offer. But such an
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awareness also brings with it a recognition of the crushing reality of
death. In order to experience life more fully the self-conscious "games
player" rips away at the very 'games" which protect him from an awareness
of his own death and give his world order and meaning.
But can it really be that Coover is not despairing? If there is
nothing beyond the grave -- and for Coover there certainly is not --
then of what value is the living of our lives? Is not Coover's vision
of man ultimately a tragic one? Coover hints at an answer in his fic-
tion, At the end of The Origin of the Brunists he tells of a character
who set up a ticket booth and charged admission to the hill where the
Brunists were to await the end of the world.
They had jailed the poor guy, hadn't set him free until he had
agreed to turn over the entire proceeds of his First Annual Spring
Carnival to the West Condon Chamber of Commerce for its industrial
brochure, had brought a series of damage suits against him, and had
started boycotting his coffeeshop, but the old bastard could still
laugh about it, and Miller laughed with him. "Oh Jesus, Tiger, we
gotta do something like that again soon!" he wheezed, dewlaps awag,
old man's lowslung paunch quaking. (Jesus, crucified, had a sudden
glimpse of all his end would lead to, and he began to giggle. A
Roman soldier, indignant at the blasphemy, thrust his spear into
Jesus' quaking side. Real blood came out, and the soldier paled.
But Jesus went right on giggling: once yqg know you're going to
die, what, really, can they do to you?) 16
In The Universal Baseball Associatiohl Inc., J. Henry Waugh, Prop. Coover
tells of a woman who 'made them all laugh and forget for a moment that
they were dying men." 129
128Coover, The Origin of the Brunists, p. 509.
129Coover, The Universal Baseball Association, Inc.J. Henry
Wauq!i, Prop., p. 27.
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As has been mentioned previously, Coover sees the comical as the
most mature human response to the randomness of the universe, wit
h tra-
gedy being an aUnie:icent response. Again his affinity -- if not 
agree-
ment -- with Kierkegaard is instructive. In Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript Kierkaard writes that the tragic and the comic result from
contradiction. Human contradiction may take many forms, but ultimately
it involves the disrelationship between physical man bound in space and
time, and imaginative man able to transcend space and time limitations.
"The tragic is the suffering contradiction," Kierkegaard writes, "the
comical, the painless contradiction. 
130 By way of explanation, he
adds: "The comic pprehension evokes the contradiction or makes it man
i-
fest by having in mind the way out, which is why the contradiction is
painless. The tragic apprehension sees the contradiction and despairs
of a way out." 
131
Both Coover and Kierkegaard believe they know the "way out" of
the contradiction of somatic/imaginative man. Kierkegaard sees the "wa
y
out' through faith in God; Coover believes it is through whole-hearted
acceptance of the world as it actually is. Coover cannot accept Kierke-
gaard's path because he sees Christians as victims of self-deception.
Informed by a positivistic culture, Coover would appear safe in making
this assertion. But it would also appear that Coover is, himself, open
to the charge of self-deception if he wishes to portray his self-con
scious
! games player" as not being in despair. Consider the following Anne
130Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 459.
131Ibid„ p. 462-463.
Mifflin Co., 1975), p, 28-29.
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Sexton poem from The Awful Rowing Toward God:
There is an animal inside me,
clutching fast to my heart,
a huge crab.
The doctors of Boston
have thrown up their hands,
They have tried scalpels,
needles, poison gasses and the like.
The crab remains.
It is a great weight.
I try to forget it, go about my business,
cook the broccoli, open and shut books,
brush my teeth and tie my shoes.
I have tried prayer
but as I pray the crab grips harder
and the pain enlarges.
I had a dream once,
perhaps it was a dream,
that the crab was my ignorance of G9d x
But who am I to believe in dreams? 134
Anne Sexton, a suicide victim, was probably as self-conscious an
individual as one could ever hope to be. Influenced by a positivistic
culture, however, she could no longer "believe in dreams" and was in-
capable of appropriating the "truth" of an existing God. But she did
not fool herself. She could not honestly accept God, and she realized
that meant she had to accept the alternative -- despair.
In saying that the self-conscious "games player" is able to open
himself up to all the possibilities, surprises and joys life has to
offer -- without experiencing despair -- Coover may himself be the victim,
of self-deception. For one, in becoming the kind of "games player"
Coover advocates one eliminates the possibility of certain kinds of
132Anne Sexton, The Awful Rowina. Toward God (Boston: Houghton
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experiences, as both Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard point out. The life
of faith has its own 'grammar" in everyday discourse, and the self-
conscious "games player" will never come to understand just what a vari-
ety of experiences are open to the person grounded in faith. For another,
it seems odd that Coover can so confidently deny that the self-conscious
'games player' is in despair. While Coover seeks to picture enlightened
man as a contented, self-conscious "games player," Kierkegaard would
appear to have the more satisfying response: either one is grounded
transparently in God, or one is in despair.
Although Robert Coover's vision of man as "games player" is an
inadequate one, his fiction is nevertheless well worth reading. He is a
powerful writer, and the philosophical and theological issues he deals
with in his fiction need serious reflection by all thinking persons.
His attacks on religion have made him disreputable in the eyes of many,
but these attacks should be kept in perspective. Coover raises serious
questions about God and religion -- questions which, at some time or
other, need to be faced by all who profess to trust in God. Thus reli-
gious persons should not be put off by Robert Coover; what should really
be disturbing to the religious person is not a literary attack on God,
but indifference.
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